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Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant 
Reunification Decisions Should Be Based on the Best 
Interest of the Child 
Marcia Zug 
Blanca is a nineteen-year-old undocumented immigrant from 
Guatemala. Blanca speaks no English and only a little Spanish. She 
comes from a remote region in Guatemala where the primary language 
is an indigenous dialect called Xinca. The village Blanca grew up in is 
incredibly poor. There is no hospital, illiteracy rates are high, sanitation 
is inadequate, and nutritious food can be scarce. She entered the 
United States without documentation, hoping to make a better life for 
herself. Her son Xavier was born a year later. Xavier is now 19 months 
old and Blanca is being deported. Xavier was removed from Blanca’s 
care shortly before she was detained. At that time, the state welfare 
agency determined that Blanca’s living arrangement, a studio 
apartment she shared with two other families, constituted neglect. Since 
her detention, Blanca has had little contact with Xavier, but she wishes 
to take Xavier with her when she is deported. The family court denied 
her request finding that returning to Guatemala with Blanca is 
contrary to Xavier’s best interest. The judge then severed Blanca’s 
parental rights and Xavier was adopted by Mark and Sandra, a 
middle class couple from Encino, California who have been foster 










   Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. I would like to 
thank Elizabeth Bartholet, Harvard Law School, James Dwyer, William and Mary College of 
Law, Martin Guggenheim, New York University Law School, and Thomas Crocker, University 
of South Carolina School of Law for their very helpful comments. 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:57 PM 




I. THE STATE’S INTEREST IN IMMIGRANT CHILDREN………...1144 
A. The State’s Role as Parens Patriae .............................. 1146 
B. The State’s Interest in Teaching Children the 
Fundamental Values of a Democratic Society ............ 1147 
C. The State’s Interest in Keeping American Children 
Connected to America .............................................. 1150 
D. The Other Solution ................................................... 1152 
II. PARENTAL RIGHTS .............................................................. 1153 
A. What Are Parental Rights and Where Do They Come 
From? ...................................................................... 1153 
1. The origin of parental rights ................................. 1154 
B. The Case for Parental Rights ...................................... 1156 
1. Parental rights benefit children ............................. 1157 
2. Parental rights benefit the state ............................ 1157 
3. The problems with parental rights ........................ 1159 
4. Parental rights as a danger to children .................. 1160 
5. Parental rights as a danger to liberalism ................ 1162 
III. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS .......................................................... 1164 
A. What Are Children’s Rights? ...................................... 1164 
B. The Case for Children’s Rights ................................... 1167 
1. Children’s rights benefit children ......................... 1167 
2. Children’s rights benefit the state ......................... 1169 
C. The Problem with Children’s Rights .......................... 1170 
IV. PARENTAL RIGHTS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND IMMIGRANT 
CHILDREN...................................................................... 1171 
A. Parental Rights Assumptions and Separations Due to 
Abuse and Neglect ................................................... 1172 
B. Parental Rights Assumptions and Separations Due to 
Status ....................................................................... 1173 
C. Presuming Children Want to Be with Their Biological 
Parents ..................................................................... 1176 
D. Parental Rights Assumption Regarding Stability and 
Security .................................................................... 1178 
V. IMMIGRANT REUNIFICATION DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE 
UNDER A BEST INTEREST STANDARD ............................. 1179 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:57 PM 
1139 Should I Stay or Should I Go 
 1141 
A. State and Children’s Interests Align ............................ 1179 
B. A Best Interest Standard Does Not Automatically 
Require Separation ................................................... 1180 
VI. A WORKABLE FRAMEWORK ................................................. 1181 
A. The Adoption and Safe Families Act ........................... 1183 
B. Third Party Visitation Cases ....................................... 1187 
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................... 1191 
 
 
In March 2011, Emily Ruiz, a four-year-old American citizen 
boarded a plane from Guatemala to return home to New York.1 Her 
grandfather accompanied her, but when he was denied entry into the 
United States due to a twenty-year-old immigration violation, 
Emily’s family was faced with a dilemma: should Emily return with 
her grandfather to Guatemala, should she be allowed to be taken 
into state custody, or should her parents, both undocumented 
immigrants, risk deportation by attempting to pick her up from U.S. 
immigration authorities? Emily’s parents chose to have her return 
with her grandfather. The reaction to the story of Emily Ruiz was 
immediate. Pro-immigrant supporters expressed outrage at what they 
termed the “deportation” of an American citizen.2 Others were 
furious that Emily had citizenship at all, calling her an “anchor baby” 
and the perfect example of why birthright citizenship must be 
eliminated.3 Emily’s story and the passionate reactions it has created 
highlight the virulent debate raging in this country over the meaning 
of citizenship. This Article focuses on the most important part of 
that debate: how birthright citizenship, combined with the massive 
 
 1. Girl, Unable to Enter U.S., Will Try Again, CNN.COM (Mar. 29, 2011, 11:57 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/03/29/guatemala.girl.deported/index.htm
l?hpt=T2. 
 2. Ruben Navarrette Jr., Why Was A Four Year Old American Girl Deported?, 
CNN.COM (Mar. 23, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-23/opinion/navarrette.child. 
deported_1_illegal-immigrants-anchor-babies-american-girl?_s=PM:OPINION. 
 3. See CNN.COM, supra note 1 (including comments such as “CNN should show 
another pic next to this cute ‘citizen’ of all the resources and fees she will incur because she’s 
the product of illegality!” and “Here is another story of a illegal anchor baby. Booo hooo cnn. 
Illegal is ILLEGAL and I don’t care what age you are. Want to come to this great country of 
ours, go through the proper channels, assimulate [sic] and speak ENGLISH!”). 
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crackdown on illegal immigration, threatens the future of American 
democracy. 
In my article, Separation, Deportation, Termination,4 I discuss 
the increasing practice of separating immigrant parents from their 
American-born children and using the parents’ deportation as the 
justification for terminating their parental rights. I explain how the 
courts that grant these terminations and the child welfare agencies 
that seek them do so based on the belief that such terminations are 
in the child’s best interest. I also explain that such considerations 
violate what has long been (or traditionally) recognized as the 
constitutional right of parents to make decisions regarding the care 
and control of their children. My goal in Separation, Deportation, 
Termination is to demonstrate that these legally unjustified 
terminations are occurring and to explain why.5 However, I do not 
address the normative question of whether such terminations should 
occur. This Article attempts to answer that question. 
In this Article, I argue that despite a long-established 
presumption favoring parental rights, a children’s rights standard is 
appropriate in cases concerning deportable immigrant parents with 
children who are American citizens. Such cases involve very different 
considerations than typical parental rights termination cases. These 
are not simply cases about children’s rights or parental rights. 
Rather, these cases raise questions about the very meaning and 
purpose of citizenship in a liberal state. The state’s interest in citizen 
children far exceeds the state’s interest in their noncitizen parents.6 
 
 4. Marcia Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1648999. 
 5. I explain that in a significant percentage of immigrant parent termination cases, 
courts and agencies support termination not because the immigrant parents are legally unfit, 
but because they believe termination allows the children to have better lives. The concerns 
expressed in these cases focus on the perceived economic, social, educational, and medical 
inferiority of the parent’s country of origin, as well as the parents’ parenting abilities, which 
were already frequently viewed as suboptimal and would arguably become even more so once 
the parents returned to countries lacking the parenting support and educational services 
available in the United States. 
 6. See infra Part I (demonstrating that significant state interests are implicated because 
the children in these cases are primarily American citizens, and consequently, these 
terminations implicate issues of citizenship and democracy that are of significant interest to the 
state). See also James Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the Rights 
of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755, 762–66 (2009) (noting the state’s essential 
involvement in formation of all parent-child relationships). 
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Consequently, although it is well established in other contexts that 
fit parents have the right to the care and custody of their children, 
this presumption is not appropriate when considering the rights of 
undocumented, noncitizen parents. Once the parent of a child who 
is an American citizen is facing deportation, the rights of the child 
should be viewed as superior to those of their noncitizen parent. At 
this point, the overriding concern must be ensuring that the child’s 
best interests are served. In some instances, this will require 
terminating the rights of fit immigrant parents. 
This Article begins with a discussion of the state’s interest in 
ensuring a strong and meaningful connection between children who 
are American citizens and the United States. After firmly establishing 
that it is in the state’s interest for children who are American citizens 
to be raised in the United States, or at least exposed to an American 
lifestyle, this Article will then argue why a best interest standard is 
appropriate in deportation cases. It will then compare the pros and 
cons of both a parental rights and a children’s rights standard and 
explain why many of the assumptions underlying these standards are 
inapplicable in the immigration context. In particular, this Article 
argues that once a parent is facing deportation, the benefits of a best 
interest standard far exceed the benefits of a parental rights standard. 
Accordingly, I suggest that a shifting standard should apply.  
Specifically, I argue that courts should apply a parental rights 
standard when deportation is an unlikely possibility and that a best 
interest standard should be used when deportation is probable. I 
argue that this shifting standard is both desirable and workable as 
long as the shift between standards is based on a clear triggering 
event, which in these cases would be the parent(s)’ likely 
deportation. After explaining this framework, I provide two examples 
demonstrating that this compromise between parental rights and 
children’s rights is neither novel nor overly complicated. Lastly, 
although I ultimately conclude that a best interest standard should 
replace the traditional fitness standard when parents are facing 
deportation, I also suggest that even under this standard, the 
separation of immigrant children from their biological parents should 
be rare. In most cases, an examination of the facts will reveal that 
termination of parental rights is not in the best interest of immigrant 
children. 
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I. THE STATE’S INTEREST IN IMMIGRANT CHILDREN 
Encarnacion Bail Romero is an undocumented immigrant 
mother who was arrested in a workplace raid for the use of false 
identification. While Bail was in prison for a crime that the Supreme 
Court would later determine is not a criminal offense,7 her son 
Carlos was placed in the care of Seth and Melinda Moser.8 The 
Mosers soon fell in love with Carlos and wanted to adopt him. Bail 
vehemently objected to this adoption.9 Nevertheless, despite her 
desire to resume custody of Carlos, her two years in prison took their 
toll on her relationship with Carlos. During her incarceration, Bail 
had no contact with Carlos and as a result, her son now considers the 
Mosers his mom and dad. In addition, Carlos is settled in his new 
home, he speaks only English, and he even goes by a different name, 
Jamison. These and similar facts convinced the trial court that it was 
in Carlos/Jamison’s best interest to remain with the Mosers, and the 
court terminated Bail’s parental rights.10 
The trial court’s decision was a shocking violation of Bail’s 
parental rights. However, it may have been the right decision for her 
son. Discussion of this case has tended to focus on this clash between 
parental rights and children’s rights.11 Under current law, fit parents 
have a constitutional right to the care and custody of their children.12 
 
 7. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009) (striking down the law 
criminalizing aggravated identity theft because according to the Supreme Court, there must be 
intent). Consequently, this means Bail Romero was separated from her child for committing a 
crime that was never a crime. 
 8. Mariano Castillo, Heart-Wrenching Fight for Immigrant’s Son, CNN.COM, (Dec. 
20, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-20/us/missouri.immigrant.child_1_biological-
mother-adoptive-parents-illegal-immigrant?_s=PM:US. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. See also S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793, 803–
04 (Mo. 2011) (discussing the factual background and trial court’s decision). 
 11. See In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 824 (describing this case as a 
“travesty in . . . its long duration, and its impact on Mother, Adoptive Parents, and, most 
importantly, Child”). For similar discussions of pitting parental rights against children’s rights, 
see Missouri Supreme Court Must Reunite Child with Immigrant Mother, STLTODAY.COM 
(Nov. 15, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/ columns/the-
platform/article_b0ae81d6-f10c-11df-95d9-00127992bc8b.html? (noting the “curious” lack 
of discussion of Bail’s parental rights, as if she were a nonperson); Stephen Bilkis, Messy 
Adoption Could see Child Returned to Mother, NEW YORK FAMILY LAW BLOG (Feb. 5, 2011), 
http://www.newyorkfamilylawblog.com/2011/02/messy_adoption_could_see_child.html 
(describing this as a case about the best interests of the child and lamenting the fact that the 
mother might have the child returned for “political” reasons). 
 12. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (noting that the “interest of 
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This standard is commonly referred to as the parental rights 
standard, and it should have been used in the Bail Romero case. 
Under this standard, the court would have had a very difficult time 
justifying the termination of Bail’s parental rights. But instead of 
employing a parental rights standard, the court used a best-interest-
of-the-child standard.13 Consequently, the court found termination 
was appropriate because the court concluded it was in the child’s 
best interest to remain with the Mosers. Similarly, on appeal, the 
Missouri Supreme Court substantially validated the trial court’s 
decision.14 The supreme court ignored evidence of the mother’s 
repeated and thwarted attempts to maintain a relationship with her 
son, which the court determined was not properly in the record, and 
thus agreed with the trial court’s dubious conclusion that Bail had 
abandoned her child and that adoption was in his best interest.15 
The fight over Carlos/Jamison sharply illustrates the difference 
between a parental rights standard and a children’s rights standard. 
However, it is wrong to view this case solely as a conflict between 
children’s and parents’ rights. Carlos/Jamison is an American 
citizen. His mother is not, and she will be deported.16 Thus, if Bail is 
permitted to resume custody, Carlos/Jamison will return with her to 
Guatemala. Allowing such a departure is not in the state’s interest.17 
If reunification is not in Carlos/Jamison’s interest, then the State has 
the right and perhaps the obligation to prevent it. In reunification 
cases involving parents facing deportation, the rights of children who 
 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
753 (1982) (describing this right as “a fundamental liberty interest”); Smith v. OFFER, 431 
U.S. 816 (1977) (refusing to grant constitutional protections to foster parents that would 
infringe on the constitutional right of parents to the care and custody of their children). 
 13. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 828 (Stith, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (concluding that there was no basis for the finding of abandonment). 
 14. Id. at 816 (majority opinion) (noting that although the Missouri Supreme Court 
reversed the termination decision it remanded rather than order reunification based on its 
conclusion that the trial court had offered “clear, cogent and convincing evidence” to support 
its finding of abandonment). 
 15. Id. at 828 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the 
substantial evidence disproving abandonment). 
 16. Bail’s deportation has been stayed pending her appeal, but there has been no 
cancellation of removal order entered. Once the case is over, she will be deported. See id. 
 17. See infra Part I.A–D (discussing the state’s interest in having American citizens 
raised in America and exposed to the ideas of liberalism). 
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are American citizens should outweigh the rights of their noncitizen 
parents. 
A. The State’s Role as Parens Patriae 
Most children involved in immigrant parental rights termination 
cases are, or have the ability to become, American citizens.18 
Therefore, the state has a particular interest in their well-being.19 The 
state’s interest in the health and future of American children has 
often been held to trump parental rights. The Supreme Court clearly 
articulated this idea in Prince v. Massachusetts.20 Prince involved a 
mother who was a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and who had 
permitted her daughter to sell religious pamphlets and proselytize on 
city streets at night.21 The mother was charged with violating 
Massachusetts’s child labor laws.22 The Court articulated two reasons 
for upholding the State’s prosecution. First, the Court found that 
despite the Court’s previous decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska23 and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,24 which recognized the rights of parents to 
control the care and upbringing of their children, these rights did 
not include the right to place one’s child in danger.25 Second, the 
Court explained that even in the absence of potential danger, the 
family may be regulated when such regulation is in the public 
interest.26 The Prince Court stated that: 
[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest     
. . . [a]nd neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are 
beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s 
well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s 
 
 18. See Zug, supra note 4, at 12 (noting that many of these children are American 
citizens due to birth in the United States but that others have the ability to become citizens 
based on their dependent status resulting from the termination of their parents’ parental 
rights). 
 19. See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, 
EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 8 (2006) (“[G]overnment properly takes an interest in 
families in light of the goods associated with families, the functions that families serve and the 
political values at stake in the institution of the family.”). 
 20. 321 U.S. 158 (1943). 
 21. Id. at 159–60. 
 22. Id. at 160. 
 23. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 24. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 25. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165–66. 
 26. Id. at 166–67, 170. 
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control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting 
the child’s labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not 
nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the 
child’s course on religion or conscience. . . . [T]he state has a wide 
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in 
things affecting the child’s welfare; and this includes, to some 
extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.27 
As the Court’s statement shows, the state’s interest in protecting 
children is much more than simply guarding them from physical 
harm. The state has a broad and substantial interest in the welfare of 
its children, and this interest justifies even a significant infringement 
of parental rights.28 Some of the clearest examples of such protection 
are laws guaranteeing access to education and freedom from child 
labor.29 These laws are intended to ensure that children are exposed 
to the ideas deemed essential for their future well-being as well as the 
well-being of the state. 
B. The State’s Interest in Teaching Children the Fundamental Values 
of a Democratic Society 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that children’s education 
is essential to the future of the state and that it is through education 
that the state creates a future generation capable of independent, 
autonomous thinking with the moral capacity for self-government.30 
For example, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,31 which 
concerned a student who was suspended for presenting an innuendo-
filled speech before his high school classmates, the Court upheld the 
suspension based in part on the idea that school is the place where 
children learn the rules and values essential for “citizenship in the 
Republic.”32 According to the Bethel Court, it is the role of public 
education to instill in children “the habits and manners of civility as 
values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to 
the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.”33 
 
 27. Id. at 166–67 (citations omitted). 
 28. It should be noted that children’s interests may also be subordinated to the state’s 
parens patriae interests. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). 
 29. See infra note 118. 
 30. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 178–81, 331–34 (1993). 
 31. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 32. Id. at 681. 
 33. Id. (citing C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1148 
In Ambach v. Norwick,34 the Court expressed similar sentiments, 
describing public schools as an “‘assimilative force’” that bring 
together “diverse and conflicting elements” in our society “on a 
broad but common ground.”35 Both cases demonstrate the Court’s 
acknowledgement that one of the most important purposes of 
American education is to ensure that American children receive the 
values and skills necessary for productive citizenship. Moreover, these 
cases show that the state’s interest in promoting these skills and 
values outweighs even strong parental objections.36 
One of the most telling education cases is Mozert v. Hawkins 
County Board of Education.37 This case forcefully demonstrates that 
the state’s interest in the welfare of its children includes exposing 
them to the ideas and values necessary to prepare them for their role 
as future citizens. In Mozert, a group of religious parents objected to 
reading materials assigned to their children and sued the Tennessee 
School District. The parents objected to readings on secular 
humanism, pacifism, and magic that the parents felt contradicted 
their own religious views. They sought to have the readings include 
statements indicating that the views expressed in the readings were 
incorrect and that the beliefs held by the plaintiff parents were the 
correct ones.38 The Sixth Circuit rejected the parents’ claims. The 
court believed that supporting parental rights in this instance would 
be harmful, not only to the affected children, but also to the state.39 
It recognized that the claimed parental rights would keep the 
students from achieving the intellectual and social skills necessary for 
their future role as productive citizens.40 Moreover, as Professor 
 
228 (1968)). 
 34. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
 35. Id. at 77. 
 36. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) (rejecting 
a compulsory flag salute but not questioning the appropriateness of the state’s authority to 
foster the ends of “national unity” and patriotism by “persuasion and example”); MCCLAIN, 
supra note 19, at 70 (“[F]amilies and schools are complementary, or compensatory, domains 
of moral learning: thus, even if families do not cultivate some qualities that enable good 
citizenship, schools may do so.”). 
 37. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 38. Id. at 1060–61. 
 39. Id. at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Teaching students about complex and 
controversial social and moral issues is just as essential for preparing public school students for 
citizenship and self-government as inculcating the students to the habits and manners of 
civility.”). 
 40. Id.; see also Steven J. Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in History and Theory: The 
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Steven Macias has written, the Mozert court recognized just how 
dangerous this could be. According to Macias,  
an increase in parochialism and an increase in diversity of views 
[such as that desired by the Mozert parents] [is] a sure recipe for 
social, cultural, and political strife as children become full citizens, 
expected to interact with others to govern a society foreign to them 
because of their narrow upbringing.41  
Macias then argues that: 
If liberty is valued and its continuance as a political and moral 
principle is desired, then the sovereign must be permitted to carry 
out its prerogative that its future citizens (and future sovereigns 
where a democracy is concerned) are reared in a liberal tradition. It 
would be a perverse result if parents were able to thwart future 
liberty by the exercise of their current liberty.42 
In short, the Mozert court understood that the health and future of 
the liberal state depends on the exposure of future citizens to the 
liberal tradition.43 
Mozert primarily concerned the importance of public education 
in ensuring children are exposed to the ideas necessary for their 
effective participation as future citizens. However, Mozert also shows 
how mere presence in the United States ensures one’s contact with 
these ideas. The parents in Mozert rejected the value of any views 
other than their own and wished to prevent their children’s exposure 
to these ideas. However, despite rejecting these liberal ideas, the 
parents were nevertheless quite skilled at employing them to their 
benefit. For example, although the parents objected to the tenets of 
secular humanism, they brought their case on the principles of 
freedom of religion and parental rights, both of which align with 
secular humanist views regarding separation of church and state and 
 
Origins of Family Privacy, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 133–35 (2010) (explaining that this is 
“keeping a segment of its society mentally enslaved from exercising the free and rational choice 
. . . to one educated in a liberal polity.”). 
 41. Macias, supra note 40, at 133. 
 42. Id. at 141. 
 43. It should be noted that this holding is lessened by the fact that students are 
permitted to attend religious schools or home schools, neither of which have a State-dictated 
curriculum. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1063. This, however, is uncommon because “many states 
require parents to cover certain material, or to file reports with some state or local agency.” 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW 97 
(2004). 
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independence from government control. It is clear, therefore, that 
regardless of whether the parents agreed with these views, they 
nevertheless understood these ideas and were able to employ them 
effectively.44 Consequently, the irony is that even if the Mozert 
parents had been successful, their very act of opposition would have 
ensured their children’s exposure to the ideas they were rejecting. 
Mozert thus demonstrates that within the United States the ideas of 
liberalism are pervasive and exposure is all but assured.45 At the same 
time, Mozert also highlights the problem of citizen children living 
outside the United States. For these children, the exposure to such 
fundamental values through either formal or informal training is 
much less likely.46 From the State’s perspective this is deeply 
concerning. 
C. The State’s Interest in Keeping American Children Connected to 
America 
Mozert shows that the state’s interest in the welfare of its children 
includes ensuring that children experience certain fundamental ideas 
and values. It also shows that residency within the United States 
practically ensures exposure to these principles. Mozert did not 
 
 44. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062 (noting that the parents won at the district court 
level). 
 45. See MCCLAIN, supra note 19, at 17 (“[D]eliberating with fellow citizens about the 
common good and helping to shape the central destiny of the political community is a central 
value within the civic republican strand of the American constitutional and political tradition.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 46. It is well documented that many of deported parents will be returning to countries 
highly dissimilar from the United States. In 2008, the top ten countries of origin for 
undocumented immigrants to the United States were Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Philippines, Honduras, Korea, China, Brazil, Ecuador, and India. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE 
UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2008 (Feb. 2009), available at http:// 
immigration.procon.org/sourcefiles/DHS2008.pdf. Of these, fewer than half are 
constitutional democracies like the United States (Brazil, Honduras, India, and Mexico). 
Moreover, even among those countries that are constitutional democracies, the constitutional 
rights of their citizens are still frequently hampered. For example, in its summary of The State 
of Democracy in Mexico, IDEA, The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, concluded that although “Mexico has taken significant steps towards free elections 
and political liberties . . . Mexican citizens still face many challenges. Social and economic 
inequality; high levels of corruption and inadequate governmental responsiveness; insecurity 
and crime; concentration of media ownership; and low popular participation are some of the 
issues that must still be dealt with effectively in order to further democracy in Mexico.” SoD 
Summary—State of Democracy in Mexico, IDEA, http://www.idea.int/sod/worldwide/ 
summary_sod_mexico.cfm (last visited Aug. 27, 2011). 
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directly connect this state interest in imparting liberal ideas with 
questions of citizenship, but other cases have made this connection. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically upheld laws intended to 
ensure that future American citizens have a significant connection to 
the United States.  
In Nguyen v. INS,47 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of an immigration statute that automatically 
conferred citizenship on foreign children born to American mothers, 
but required additional steps before a biological father’s American 
citizenship could be conferred onto his foreign-born child. The 
assumption underlying the different treatment is that children are 
more likely to have contact with their mothers than their fathers. 
This contact is important for two reasons. First, this contact makes a 
biological parent-child relationship much easier to verify, and 
second, this contact ensures that the future citizen has a connection 
to the United States. The Nguyen court explained that contact 
provides the “real, everyday ties that provide a connection between 
child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”48 
Consequently, the Court recognized the State’s right not to confer 
automatic citizenship on a child that may never have a strong 
connection with the United States or an American citizen. 
Reuniting immigrant children with their deported parents means 
that many of these children will lack a meaningful connection with 
the United States. However, unlike in Nguyen, these children’s 
citizenship is not an issue. The majority of children in immigrant 
parent termination cases are already citizens. Consequently, their 
ability to return to the United States is guaranteed.49 From the 
State’s perspective this is problematic because as Nguyen 
demonstrated, citizenship without a connection to the United States 
is not desirable. State interests dictate that future citizens have a 
significant connection to the United States and that the welfare and 
autonomy of these future citizens are protected.  
Similar ideas are expressed in Professor Vivian Hamilton’s essay 
on the rights of children as immature citizens. In this essay, 
Hamilton discusses the State’s duty to protect the future liberty of its 
 
 47. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 48. Id. at 65. 
 49. The jus soli doctrine confers citizenship on those born on American soil. But see 
2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 307 (proposing the elimination of jus soli in Arizona). 
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citizens. She argues: “[T]he [S]tate must guard not only [children’s] 
current liberty, but also their future liberty. It thus must deny all 
others, including parents, the right to deprive the young either of 
their basic liberty during their immaturity, or their ability to develop 
the capacity to exercise their future liberty.”50 She further argues that 
this interest gives the State the right to influence external factors, 
such as education and environment, that children experience.51 
Applying these arguments in the context of immigrant families leads 
to the conclusion that the State is justified in keeping citizen children 
in the United States after their parents’ deportation. In cases where 
reunification with deported parents will harm a child’s future liberty, 
the State has the right, and maybe even the duty, to deny others, 
including parents, the ability to mandate reunification.52 
D. The Other Solution 
As the above discussion demonstrates, the State has a strong 
interest in ensuring that future citizens have a significant connection 
to the United States. As a result, this Article argues that when a 
parent is facing deportation, reunification decisions should be based 
on the best interests of the child and may justify terminating the 
parental rights of even fit parents. I recognize, however, that this is 
far from a perfect solution. Other solutions exist but seem infeasible 
given the current political climate. For example, an immigration 
policy that permits all parents of American citizens to remain in the 
United States to care for their children would be one solution.53 If 
undocumented immigrant parents did not face the possibility of 
 
 50. Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 
1060. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1067 (arguing that the state “must . . . deny others the right to deprive 
immature citizens of their abilities to develop these future capacities”). 
 53. Kids Sue Obama Over Parents’ Deportations, CBSNEWS (June 17, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/17/national/main5093820.shtml. Such an 
approach was recently pursued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of  
Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi. The court had to determine whether the fact that a 
child is a citizen of the European Union confers a right to residence and a right to work upon 
his or her noncitizen parents. The parents argued that their deportation was a violation of the 
child’s citizenship rights and the court agreed, holding that in order for the child to have 
“genuine enjoyment of these [citizenship] rights” his parents must be allowed to live and work 
in the same country as their child. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office National de L’emploi, 
not yet reported, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en (enter 
“C-34/09” in “Case number” field, and click on “Submit”). 
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deportation, many of the arguments in favor of the children’s rights 
approach would evaporate. A solution at the other extreme would be 
to eliminate the jus soli doctrine. Jus soli confers automatic 
citizenship on all persons born on United States soil. It is due to jus 
soli that so many immigrant children have citizenship despite their 
parents’ undocumented status. Elimination of jus soli would remove 
these children’s ability to remain in the United States and thus 
eliminate the questions regarding whether they should be reunited 
with deported parents. Without jus soli, in most instances, children of 
undocumented immigrants would be deported alongside their 
parents and the State’s interest in these children after deportation 
would terminate.54 
Both of these suggestions would eliminate the problem of family 
separations due to deportation but neither is a likely solution. 
Therefore, the question of how to deal with the citizen children of 
deported parents remains and requires a different solution than 
nonimmigrant termination cases. This Article will argue that once a 
parent has been deported, the question of reunification or 
termination should be decided under a children’s rights standard. In 
other words, children of deported parents should have the right to 
prevent reunification. 
II. PARENTAL RIGHTS 
A. What Are Parental Rights and Where Do They Come From? 
Defined simply, parental rights are the rights of parents to 
control and make decisions for their children; it is well established 
that parents have this right.55 What is less clear is whether elevating 
parental rights over children’s rights is correct. Scholars such as 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse56 and James Dwyer57 have argued 
against a preference for parental rights. Others such as Martin 
 
 54. The doctrine of jus soli is currently under attack by anti-immigrant groups who 
believe it provides an unjustified loophole in America’s efforts to stem undocumented 
immigration. Such fears have been recently exacerbated by recent stories purporting to 
demonstrate the growth of the maternity tourism industry. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Arriving 
as Pregnant Tourists, Leaving with American Babies, N.Y TIMES, March 29, 2011, at A1. 
 55. See supra note 12 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court cases establishing and 
upholding this right). See also Zug, supra note 4, at 20–21. 
 56. See infra notes 965–998 and accompanying text. 
 57. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 6. 
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Guggenheim have defended this preference.58 However, this “either-
or” approach may be unnecessary. Parental rights are preferable in 
many, maybe even most circumstances, but there is little question 
that in some circumstances a children’s rights standard may be 
better. Consequently, even if a parental rights standard is appropriate 
in most situations, this still does not justify its universal application. 
When considering the interests of citizen children and their 
noncitizen parents, the benefits of the parental rights standard are 
outweighed by the benefits of using a children’s rights standard. An 
examination of the origins of parental rights will reveal why the 
benefits of this standard are diminished in the immigration context. 
1. The origin of parental rights 
Philosophers such as Rousseau and Locke posited that parental 
rights are natural rights that exist outside of, or presuppose, man-
made law. Under this natural law theory, parental rights are God-
given and the State has no authority to interfere in the regulation of 
the family.59 The natural right of parents to raise their children is a 
common starting point for the discussion of parental rights. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court adopted 
this reasoning as part of the basis for its decision in Meyer v. 
Nebraska,60 the first Supreme Court case to articulate the idea of 
parental rights.61 
 
 58. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 59. Jean Jacques Rousseau articulated a form of this idea in a work in which he argued 
that the modern state is created by an implied contract between individuals and the state but 
that certain aspects of an individual’s freedom are not part of this contract and thus remain 
outside of government regulation. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (1979); see also John Locke, The Second Treatise of 
Government, in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 294 (1979) (describing the rights of 
parents to raise children as one of the many natural rights of men and women). But see Dwyer, 
supra note 6, at 764 (arguing that it is not obvious that the state must recognize the rights of 
biological parents and noting that historically certain biological parents such as unwed fathers 
were not afforded any rights). 
 60. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 61. Meyer and its companion case Pierce v. Society of Sisters have come to stand for the 
constitutionally protected right to private decision making regarding family concerns. Macias, 
supra note 40, at 92. It should also be noted that these ideas have been repeatedly reaffirmed. 
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (finding the rights of parents outweigh 
the rights of third parties seeking visitation with their children); Smith v. Org. of Foster 
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (finding that because foster 
parents were not “parents” they had no right to object to the removal of the foster children in 
their care). 
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The Meyer case arose as a challenge to a Nebraska state law 
forbidding children who had not yet entered eighth grade from 
receiving foreign language instruction.62 The purpose of the law was 
to achieve the homogenization of American children by ensuring 
that they would all speak a common language.63 Proponents of the 
bill believed that poor English ability was a serious hindrance to the 
future success of immigrant children.64 Consequently, the law’s 
defenders assumed that they were representing the interests of the 
children. The opponents of the law were the children’s parents who 
claimed the right to make educational decisions for their children. In 
striking down the state regulation, the Meyer Court held that the 
right of parents to make decisions regarding their children’s care was 
a natural right,65 and also that it was a right protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.66 In rejecting the 
State’s position, Justice McReynolds analogized the Nebraska law to 
Plato’s vision of the Ideal Commonwealth in which “no parent is to 
know his own child, nor any child his parent.”67 In Plato’s vision, all 
children would be children of the State. McReynolds stated that 
“[a]lthough such measures have been deliberately approved by men 
of great genius their ideas touching the relation between individual 
and state were wholly different from those upon which our 
institutions rest . . . .”68 The Court thus rejected the idea that the 
state should have a significant role in childrearing.69 
Shortly after Meyer, the Supreme Court decided Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters,70 which reaffirmed and elaborated on the constitutional 
basis for the Meyer Court’s decision.71 In Pierce, the Court struck 
down an Oregon law that required parents to send their children to 
 
 62. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397–99. 
 63. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 25 (2005). 
 64. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398. 
 65. Id. at 399. 
 66. Id. at 403. 
 67. Id. at 401–02. 
 68. Id. at 402. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 71. These cases may be viewed as companion cases; the Meyer Court was well aware of 
the fact that they would shortly be deciding Pierce. See Macias, supra note 40, at 117 (“Since 
McReynolds wrote Meyer looking ahead to Pierce, it is not surprising that the earlier decision is 
richer in content, in terms of laying out a foundational view of the parent-child and family-
state relationships.”). 
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public school.72 The Court found that this regulation 
unconstitutionally and “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control.”73 Again, as in Meyer, the Court 
emphasized the importance of recognizing and protecting parental 
rights. The Court explained that “[t]he child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations.”74 
The Meyer and Pierce cases provide the foundation for the 
current parental rights doctrine. These cases were the first to 
articulate the idea that a right to private decision making concerning 
family matters is inherent in the concept of liberty.75 In the decades 
since these cases were decided, the idea of parental rights has become 
firmly ensconced in our constitutional jurisprudence. 
B. The Case for Parental Rights 
The parental rights doctrine gives parents the right to control the 
care and upbringing of their children, and benefits parents by freeing 
them from concerns of intrusive State oversight and second-
guessing. The doctrine protects parents from the fear that one bad 
parental decision could deprive them of their children in favor of 
someone the State believes could perform the parental role better. 
The doctrine ensures that absent exceptional circumstances, parental 
decisions, good or bad, will be respected and parental custody 
protected. For these reasons, the doctrine of parental rights 
unquestionably benefits parents. However, as the Meyer and Pierce 
cases demonstrate, the argument in support of parental rights is not 
simply that it protects and benefits parents. The parental rights 
doctrine is also premised on the belief that it also benefits children 
and the State. 
 
 72.  268 U.S. at 530–31. 
 73. Id. at 534–35. 
 74. Id. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this 
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children. . . .”). 
 75. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 796 (5th ed. 
1995). 
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1. Parental rights benefit children 
The argument that parental rights benefit children is based on a 
number of assumptions.76 First is the assumption that parents are 
naturally more inclined than nonparents to act in the best interests of 
their children.77 Under this theory, strong parental rights benefit 
children because biological parents are the individuals most inclined 
to make decisions benefiting their children. Second, the doctrine 
benefits children because it assumes that children prefer to be with 
their biological parents.78 Lastly, this doctrine is believed to benefit 
children by making government intrusion into the family difficult 
and therefore providing children with a stable and secure family 
unit.79 Referring to the later two points, Professor Guggenheim 
explains that the parental rights doctrine benefits children because it 
lets “[c]hildren know that they always will be connected—
emotionally, socially, and through physical custody—to their parents 
and that their relationship will not lightly be destroyed.”80 
2. Parental rights benefit the state 
In addition to benefitting parents and children, there is a 
compelling argument that a strong parental rights standard benefits 
the state by protecting the relationship between the child, as a citizen 
and future contributor to society, and the state. According to 
parental rights advocates, parental rights are essential to ensuring the 
freedom from state control necessary for the development of the 
 
 76. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“The law’s concept of the 
family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, 
and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, 
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best 
interests of their children.”). 
 77. John Locke wrote that the “affection and tenderness which God hath planted in the 
breasts of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a 
severe, arbitrary government, but only for the help, instruction, and preservation of their 
offspring.” Locke, supra note 59, at 85. 
 78. As demonstrated by the fact that a significant number of children that were adopted 
have sought to find their birth parents, it can be assumed that everything else being equal, 
children would prefer to be raised by their birth parents. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 36. 
 79. The idea here is that this doctrine frees children from having to worry about the 
government removing them from their parents’ care. Id. Although neither of these 
assumptions has been proven with empirical evidence, parental rights advocates such as Martin 
Guggenheim conclude that “it remains a reasonable hypothesis that, all things being equal, 
children are well served by a rule that presumes their birth parents ought to raise them.” Id. 
 80.  Id. at 37. 
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next generation of independent and freethinking citizens.81 In his 
analysis of Meyer and Pierce, Professor Robert Post exemplifies this 
idea by positing that these cases safeguarded the democratic state by 
“extending ‘fundamental rights’ to the kinds of cultural practices 
deemed necessary to sustain the individuality presupposed by 
democracy.”82 According to Professor Eichner, Meyer and Pierce 
established the principle of limited State involvement in family 
matters and, because they created a zone of privacy protected from 
government intrusion, he views these cases as integral to the 
protection and continuation of our liberal democracy.83 Professors 
Eichner and Post are not alone. The importance of independence 
from government control has long been considered an integral 
aspect of a liberal democracy.  
One of the foundational beliefs of liberal theory since the 
writings of John Stuart Mill is the idea of a separate sphere of privacy 
that must be protected from government interference.84 Liberal 
theory views this cordoning off of the physical, personal, and 
intimate lives of individuals from State intrusion as the best way of 
promoting personal freedom and autonomy.85 It proposes that 
within this sphere of privacy, individuals should be permitted to act 
as they wish as long as they cause no harm to others.86 It is this idea 
that led not only to the doctrine of parental rights but to the 
recognition of many of the fundamental rights we now take for 
granted.87 Without Meyer and Pierce, there would be no Griswold or 
Lawrence.88 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82. Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court 
Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1534 (1998). 
 83. Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children’s Education?: Parents, Children, and 
the State, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (2007) (“[T]he United States is not merely a 
democracy, it is a liberal democracy, whose commitment to majoritarian rule is tempered by 
the understanding that some personal rights and liberties should not be subject to the 
majority’s preferences.”). 
 84. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (W. W. Norton & Co. 1975) 
(1859) (discussing the broad view of individual autonomy central to libertarian theory). 
 85. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 750–51 (1989). 
 86. See MILL, supra note 84, at 26 (discussing the “no harm” principle). 
 87. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 88. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, is the first case recognizing a constitutional right to privacy. 
The Griswold court made this ruling within the context of contraceptive use in the marital 
relationship. However, over time the right has been significantly expanded. Lawrence, 539 
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The parental rights doctrine prevents government intrusion into 
private family matters and thus requires childrearing decisions to be 
left in the hands of parents.89 Consequently, the doctrine denies the 
government a significant means of shaping and controlling the ideas, 
interests, and values of its future citizens.90 By preventing such 
governmental intrusion, the doctrine of parental rights ensures that 
the role of the government is to serve the will of the people. As the 
Supreme Court has stated, values, morality, and religion are things 
“the [S]tate can neither supply nor hinder.”91 Parental rights 
supporters hold that the doctrine of parental rights benefits the state 
by helping to guarantee the independence and free thought of future 
generations of American citizens.92 
3. The problems with parental rights 
Despite the many benefits of the parental rights doctrine, the 
doctrine also has significant drawbacks. The most obvious problem 
with parental rights is that they are almost by definition an 
infringement on children’s rights. At its most basic level, parental 
rights are the rights of parents to control and make decisions 
regarding their children.93 The only significant exception to this 
otherwise vast power is when parents are so unfit that their actions 
 
U.S. 558, is the most recent case concerning and expanding the right to privacy. The Lawrence 
Court held that this right extends to all private sexual conduct between consenting adults. 
 89. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 27 (arguing that the legal system’s insistence on 
private ordering of familial life ultimately guards against state control of its citizens). 
 90. MCCLAIN, supra note 19, at 3 (“[F]amilies have a place in the project of forming 
persons into capable, responsible, self-governing citizens”); RAWLS, supra note 30, at 43 
(arguing that families are essential in “establishing a social world within which alone we can 
develop with care, nurture, and education, and no little good fortune, into free and equal 
citizens”). 
 91. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
 92. Joseph Raz, Liberty and Trust, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 113 
(Robert P. George ed., 1996) (explaining that government should “stand back and let people 
have the choice as to how to conduct their own lives” but also arguing that the government 
“must take active steps, where needed, to ensure that people enjoy the basic capacities (physical 
and mental) and have the resources to avail themselves of an adequate range of options 
available in their society”); see also MCCLAIN, supra note 19, at 20 (noting that the family role 
serves as “a check on governmental power”). 
 93. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of 
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation 
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”). 
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endanger the life or health of their children.94 Outside of that 
extreme situation, the parental rights doctrine gives parents the 
freedom to act in ways that are indifferent or even harmful to the 
interests of their children. It should therefore come as little surprise 
that the Court that decided Meyer and Pierce and established the 
constitutional doctrine of parental rights was the same Court that 
repeatedly struck down Progressive reforms such as child labor 
restrictions, mandatory free public schooling, and maternal and 
infant health programs.95 The doctrine of parental rights assumes 
that parental rights benefit children, but it contains no requirement 
that such benefits actually occur. Similarly, the assumption that 
parental rights benefit the state by assuring the autonomy and 
privacy needed to raise independent-thinking future citizens is also 
not guaranteed. This independence can just as easily allow parents to 
raise their children with beliefs that undermine and threaten liberal 
values.  
4. Parental rights as a danger to children 
In her compelling attack on parental rights, Professor Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse describes parental rights as akin to property 
rights. She notes that through the doctrine of parental rights, courts 
gave “primacy to the parents’ natural rights of possession. The 
child’s ‘best interests’ served as a tie-breaker in disputes between 
parents,” but was ignored if the dispute was between a parent and a 
third party, even if that person was “a relative who had raised the 
child from infancy.”96 Moreover, Woodhouse argued that even when 
children are not considered property themselves, their best interests 
 
 94. Of course, there are specific laws that infringe on this right to an extent, such as 
mandatory school laws and child labor laws. However, even these give parents significant 
leeway in how they will be enforced. For example, homeschooling is permissible, as are certain 
types of employment, most notably work on a family farm. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1) (2006) (“[P]rovisions of section 212 of this title relating to child labor 
shall not apply to any employee employed in agriculture outside of school hours . . . if such 
employee—is less than twelve years of age and (i) is employed by his parent, or . . . (ii) is 
employed, with the consent of his parent . . . .”). 
 95. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights: 
Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 
27 (1999). 
 96. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the 
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1048 (1992) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Who 
Owns the Child]. In addition, as Woodhouse notes, this “stranger” is often a person or a 
relative who has raised the child from infancy. Id. 
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are often defined in relation to property.97 By comparing parental 
rights to a property right over children, Woodhouse forcefully calls 
into question the assumption that parental rights benefit children.98 
Even if parental rights may occasionally or even routinely have 
ancillary benefits for children, the doctrine of parental rights begins 
to look suspiciously like the right of parents to do what is best for 
the parents with no more than the hope that such decisions will 
benefit the children as well.99 The Supreme Court case of Wisconsin 
v. Yoder highlights this concern.100 
The issue in Yoder was whether Amish parents could exempt 
their children from Wisconsin’s compulsory education statute and 
remove their children from school after the completion of eighth 
grade.101 The parents wanted their children to remain members of 
the Amish community and feared that additional years of schooling 
would leave the children inadequately prepared to assume life as part 
of the Amish community. The Court ruled for the parents based on 
the doctrine of parental rights.102 However, as the dissent pointed 
out, this ruling all but guaranteed that the children would have no 
choice but to remain part of the Amish community.103 According to 
Justice Douglas, the Court’s decision allowed Amish parents to keep 
their children “harnessed to the Amish way of life” and “forever 
barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity we 
have today.”104 Douglass feared that the impact of such parental 
decisions could be long lasting, ominously predicting that if a child’s 
“education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and 
deformed.”105 It may be that given the choice, most Amish children 
 
 97. Id. at 1047 (citing Buchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986); Garska v. McCoy, 
278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981)) (finding the child’s best interests were served by placing him 
with the more economically advantaged father and ignoring the fact that the father had 
statutorily raped the child’s mother). 
 98. See infra note 121 (comparing parental rights to slavery). 
 99. See generally Dwyer, supra note 6 (arguing that placing newborns with parents 
simply based on a biological connection may violate the newborns’ constitutional rights). 
 100. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 101. Id. at 207. 
 102. Id. at 233–34. 
 103. Id. at 242–45 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
 104. Id. at 245. 
 105. Id. at 246; see also JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
23 (1998) (arguing in the context of religious schooling that favoring the religious interests of 
parents over the temporal interests of children harms the children in multiple ways. For 
example, he writes: “Female students in particular appear to internalize the messages of self-
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would wish to forgo schooling and remain part of the Amish 
community; however, the Yoder decision did not give this choice to 
the children, it gave the decision to their parents. 
The Yoder decision was bad for children, but it did not involve 
bad parents. There is no reason to assume that the parents in Yoder 
had anything but their children’s best interests at heart. Nevertheless, 
giving this decision making power to the parents was not in their 
children’s best interest. As Justice Douglas noted, the parents’ 
decision eliminated nearly all possible futures for these children save 
the one the parents desired. It is hard to imagine that a person’s best 
interest can truly be served by having their entire future dictated by 
another. Yoder demonstrates how easily the children of loving 
parents can be harmed by the parental rights doctrine and thus 
reveals how this doctrine can have catastrophic consequences for the 
children of abusive and neglectful parents. In the worst case scenario, 
the doctrine’s policy of noninterference means that even in child 
abuse and neglect cases, courts and agencies may initially be 
reluctant to interfere and too willing to return children to unsafe 
homes after they have been removed.106  
5. Parental rights as a danger to liberalism 
Just as the assumption that parental rights benefit children is 
questionable, the assumption that parental rights benefit the state is 
also vulnerable to attack. Parental rights can harm the state by 
limiting children’s exposure to ideas and creating factionalism. The 
doctrine of parental rights supports the privatization of families, 
which can injure the state by increasing the number of different and 
often extreme points of view within a society.107 Consequently, the 
doctrine of parental rights can significantly harm the state. As 
Professor Hamilton notes: 
 
abnegation and the sinfulness of sex . . . . They find themselves unable as adults to act on 
desires, to take control of their sexual/reproductive lives, or to leave abusive marriages.”). 
 106. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770–91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the child possessed an interest in a “stable, nurturing homelife” that might not 
be served by reunification with the parents after having experienced abuse and separation); see 
also Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (involving facts where the state’s 
failure to remove a child from an abusive home led to permanent and severe brain injury); 
MURRAY A. STRAUS & RICHARD J. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: 
RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES 427 (1990) 
(documenting that abused children are at a high risk of re-injury). 
 107. Macias, supra note 40, at 133. 
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The liberal democratic state is its citizens. And citizens are born, 
but they are also made. How its citizens come to be—whether the 
educations they receive will expand or constrain their future 
options, whether the values they assimilate will encourage or 
dissuade their civic engagement, etc.—fundamentally concerns the 
state.108 
 Similarly, in her book Democratic Education, Professor Amy 
Gutmann raises related concerns in the context of parental rights 
versus state control over education. Gutmann acknowledges that 
significant state regulation over education may conflict with parental 
rights. Nonetheless, she justifies such infringement by arguing that 
parental rights do not include “a right of parents to insulate their 
children from exposure to ways of life or thinking that conflict with 
their own.”109 She further suggests that a liberal state has an 
obligation to provide its citizen children with a democratic education 
stating that the State must teach these “future citizens respect for 
opposing points of view and ways of life,”110 and that it is illegitimate 
for any person “to deprive any child of the capacities necessary for 
choice among good lives.”111 
Such ideas are also echoed by Professors William Galston and 
Steven Macedo. In his book Liberal Purposes, Galston argues that it 
is the obligation of the liberal state to teach children the skills and 
values needed to live in and support our democratic society. 
Consequently, he argues that “[j]ust as parents are prevented from 
impeding children’s health development, they should not be able to 
impede their children’s acquisition of knowledge and ‘habits that 
support the polity and enable individuals to function completely in 
public affairs.’”112 Similarly, Macedo argues it is the state’s duty to 
make sure that all children receive a “liberal civic education,”113 and 
that it is reasonable to impose some limits on parents’ control over 
their children “for the sake of reasonable common efforts to insure 
 
 108. Hamilton, supra note 50, at 1058. 
 109. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 29 (1987). 
 110. Id. at 30. 
 111. Id. at 40. 
 112. Courtney Moran, How to Regulate Homeschooling: Why History Supports the Theory of 
Parental Choice, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1061, 1084 (2011) (citing WILLIAM GALSTON, 
LIBERAL PURPOSES 252 (1991)). 
 113. Steven Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of 
God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETHICS 468, 473–76 (1995). 
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that all future citizens learn the minimal prerequisites of 
citizenship.”114 
The above discussion demonstrates that both the potential 
benefits and pitfalls of the parental rights doctrine are substantial, 
but this doctrine cannot be truly examined without a similarly close 
look at its counterpoint, the doctrine of children’s rights. It is only 
by examining the two that the relative merits can be assessed. 
III. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
A. What Are Children’s Rights? 
The concept of children’s rights does not lend itself to easy 
definition.115 Such rights include the protection of children’s needs 
and welfare, but can also include their right to freedoms such as 
association, expression, and religion.116 Professor Kathleen Federle 
has described these two different conceptions of children’s rights as 
“one acknowledging the primacy of self-determination, [and] the 
other emphasizing nurturance.”117 Although both types of rights are 
now considered part of the term “children’s rights,” this was not 
always true. The concept of children’s rights developed in two 
stages. The first children’s rights movement was part of the 
Progressive movement, which sought to improve the lives and 
welfare of children through child labor laws, mandatory schooling, 
and juvenile courts.118 The Progressives conceived of children’s rights 
as rights to be protected and nurtured. In addition, the Progressive 
reformers believed such protection was good not only for the 
children but also for the State. They believed that children’s rights 
 
 114. Id. at 485–86. 
 115. Annette Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. 
L.J. 141, 151–52 (2004) (noting that “the ideas of ‘children’ and ‘rights’ are separately and 
together extraordinarily complex and variable” and that the term “‘children’s rights’ is used 
extraordinarily loosely and broadly”). 
 116. Id. at 152. 
 117. Kathleen Federle, Children, Curfews and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1315, 
1315 (1995). 
 118. There have been two important children’s rights movements. GUGGENHEIM, supra 
note 63, at 1. The first was led by the Progressives in the nineteenth century. Id. The 
Progressive movement focused on what was good for children by proposing legislation to help 
children. Id. Legislation such as the Keating-Owen Act was introduced to limit child labor. 
Keating-Owen Act, 64 P.L. 249, 39 Stat. 675 (1916) (declared unconstitutional by Hammer 
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)). Other Progressive reforms included common schools 
and mandatory school attendance. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 2. 
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benefit the state by ensuring that the basic needs of its future citizens 
are taken care of and also by making sure that their intellectual and 
political needs are met. According to Progressives, children’s rights 
included the right to an education that would expose them to the 
ideas and principles of democratic government.119 
The second children’s rights movement developed in the 1960s 
and focused on the rights of children as independent and 
autonomous beings.120 During this period, parental control began to 
be viewed as oppression,121 and treating children differently from 
adults was seen as discrimination that denied children “their right to 
full humanity.”122 Children’s advocates began to advance claims 
based on the “child’s individual personhood” and sought to separate 
“children’s interests from their parents’.”123 Due to this second 
children’s rights movement, children’s rights began to include more 
than the right to be protected, nurtured, and educated.124 Children’s 
rights now included the right to be free from adult (usually parental) 
 
 119. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 1–2. (Noting that the children’s movement 
spearheaded by the Progressive reformers was one which sought to transfrom the issue of child 
well-being from “parental responsibility to an issue that government and those who forged 
official policy had a responsibility to address.”). 
 120. Id. at 7–8. 
 121. Some have even compared such control to slavery. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & 
Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (likening the status of children to that of slaves); James G. Dwyer, 
Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1371, 1412–15 (1994) (comparing children to slaves and property in general); 
Michael D. A. Freeman, The Limits of Children’s Rights, in THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS 29, 30 (Michael Freeman & Philip Veerman eds., 1992) (describing those who lack 
rights as slaves); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Out of Children’s Needs, Children’s Rights”: 
The Child’s Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 326 (1993–1994) (describing 
the parent child relationship as similar to slavery). But see GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 9 
(describing such comparisons as “overheated nonsense”). 
 122. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 6; see also Federle, supra note 117, at 1344 
(stating that just as “the infantilization of African Americans was nothing more than an 
attempt to control and oppress an entire race” that “[t]heories which cannot accommodate the 
rights of children perpetuate these traditions of power and dominance”); Stephen Scales, 
Intergenerational Justice and Care in Parenting, 28 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 667, 668 (2002) 
(referring to the status of children in American law as a “moral nightmare” and an “evil and 
morally hideous” position). 
 123. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 13. 
 124. Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child, supra note 96, at 1002 (“[O]ur attachment to 
[the] property-based notion of the private child cuts off a more fruitful consideration of the 
rights of all children to safety, nurture, and stability, to a voice, and to membership in the 
national family”). 
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control that did not serve their interests or sufficiently consider their 
wishes.125 
As a result of these two children’s rights movements, the current 
conception of children’s rights includes protection rights,126 meaning 
the right to be free from harm, as well as autonomy rights, meaning 
the right to make choices about one’s own life.127 However, both 
aspects of children’s rights still lack the widespread acceptance 
enjoyed by parental rights.128 Current U.S. law recognizes both types 
of children’s rights, but only in particular contexts and to limited 
degrees. For instance, a child’s right to protection can be seen in the 
laws that exist to prevent child abuse and neglect, to prevent child 
labor, and to require school attendance. However, there are no laws 
that protect children from the dangers of selfish or uninterested 
parents. Similarly, the law recognizes some autonomy rights in 
children, such as minors’ rights to abortion and free expression,129 
 
 125. Id.; Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the 
Rights of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585 (1995). 
 126. Protection rights include the rights to be fed and sheltered. See Appell, supra note 
115, at 157 (noting this type of children’s rights “predates contemporary notions of children’s 
rights”). They also include the right to be protected from other types of harm such as physical 
abuse or unsafe working conditions, military service, and unreasonable searches and seizures. 
See Jonathan O. Hafen, Children’s Rights and Legal Representation—The Proper Roles of 
Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 423, 437–38 
(1993). 
 127. Autonomy rights include rights such as those of association and expression. See 
Appell, supra note 115, at 152; see also Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The 
Constitutional Rights of Children To Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 
MD. L. REV. 358, 362, 395 (1994) (discussing children’s rights in terms of associational 
rights); Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 223 (1999) (discussing children’s rights in terms of autonomy). Legal 
examples of children’s autonomy rights include, for example, the right of minors to have 
abortions without parental consent. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (striking down 
a mandatory parental notification requirement); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 
(1976). 
 128. One example is the United States’ long opposition to ratification of the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The U.S.’s objection to the convention, which 
protects children from harms such as sexual exploitation and child labor, is the fear that it will 
impinge on parents’ rights to raise their children as they see fit. Among other concerns, 
opponents fear that the clause banning torture and other cruel and inhuman punishment could 
be interpreted to ban spankings. See Brian Montopoli, 31 Senators Oppose U.N. Children’s 
Rights Convention, CBS NEWS (Aug. 24, 2010, 6:22 p.m.), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
503544_162-20014613-503544.html. 
 129. There are fewer examples of such legally protected rights and even when they exist, 
they are typically less robust and protected than similar rights of adults. For example, children 
have many of the same constitutional rights as adults, but to a lesser degree. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly upheld these weaker constitutional protections. See Appell, supra note 
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but gives children no right to make other decisions such as whether 
to marry, work, or even see an R-rated movie. Children’s rights 
advocates seek to increase both the protection130 and autonomy 
rights131 of children. These advocates object to the weaker 
protections afforded to children’s rights and reject the idea that 
parental rights should trump children’s rights. 
B. The Case for Children’s Rights 
1. Children’s rights benefit children 
 
As the reverend Hastings H. Hart, a well-known Progressive 
reformer, stated in a 1901 speech, children’s rights should be 
recognized for two reasons: “first, because the child has a natural 
right to an opportunity for normal and healthy development; second 
because the care of such children is essential to the preservation of 
the community.”132 Hart’s first argument in favor of children’s rights 
is the proposition that recognizing children’s rights is good for the 
child. Although the definition of children’s rights has expanded 
significantly in the century since Hart made this statement,133 the 
idea that children’s rights are good for the child is still the essential 
 
115, at 154 (“These rights follow those of adults but are extended only partially, or differently, 
to children because of their minority status. These rights recognize children as persons under 
the Constitution and extend due process and equal protection of the law to them, but in 
limited, or even special, ways because of their minority.”); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954) (recognizing, for the first time, children as “persons” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 130. For example, many children’s rights advocates voice significant opposition to family 
reunification policies, which they contend fail to sufficiently protect the best interests of 
children sufficiently. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 110 (1999) (“The most 
extreme forms of intervention work best for children. Children placed in foster homes do 
better than children whose families are kept together, and children placed in adoptive homes 
do better yet. They would do even better if we moved them on to adoption promptly, rather 
than subjecting them to the kind of damaging delays that routinely occur in today’s system.”); 
James Dwyer, Children’s Interests in a Family Context—A Cautionary Note, 39 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1053, 1067 (1999) (suggesting that parental terminations should be governed by a 
best interests of the child standard). 
 131. See, e.g., Federle, supra note 125, at 1595. 
 132. Hasting H. Hart, The Child-Saving Movement, 58 BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 520 
(1901). 
 133. The definition of children’s rights now includes components focused on the 
autonomy of the child. As Professor James Dwyer has argued, children’s rights theorists 
recognize children as free and equal persons protected by the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. DWYER, supra note 105, at 122–28. 
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basis for the children’s rights movement. Children’s rights advocates, 
such as Professors Elizabeth Bartholet and James Dwyer, base their 
arguments in support of children’s rights on the idea that children’s 
best interests are served when children’s rights are favored over 
parental rights and that children’s best interests should be protected 
even at the cost of diminished parental rights.  
Advocates for children’s rights cite numerous instances where 
children’s interests conflict with parental interests.134 As a result, 
these advocates conclude that freeing children from parental control 
is essential to their welfare. They also argue that the benefits of 
children’s rights are more than simply freeing children from parental 
control and potentially harmful parental decision making. Children’s 
rights also benefit children because this approach includes the 
imposition of duties on those charged with the care of children.135 
These duties, imposed on caretakers, communities, and the state 
permit children to achieve their full potential by ensuring children’s 
ability to develop their capacities and talents.136 Consequently, 
children’s rights benefit children because they protect children from 
the harm of parental control and because they impose duties on 
 
 134. Professor Bartholet has raised such concerns in the context of foster care and 
termination, arguing that longer periods before termination of parental rights, while arguably 
good for parents, can be disastrous for their children who must spend longer periods in foster 
care limbo. See generally, BARTHOLET, supra note 130. Professor Dwyer discusses this conflict 
in the context of education arguing that parental control over their children’s education can 
deprive their children of the skills and knowledge that could benefit them in adulthood. See 
James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting the Public Into the Religious Square, 42 WM. &. 
MARY L. REV 963, 966 (2001) (“Most arguments about child-rearing issues give little 
attention to, and often simply ignore, the developmental interests of the children involved. 
Instead they focus on the interests and rights of parents . . . . For that reason they are 
deficient.”). 
 135. Given the dependent nature of children, children’s rights would mean little without 
attendant duties to help them effectuate these rights. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. 
Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995) (describing the parent as a kind of 
fiduciary with responsibility for the child’s welfare but not as an actual owner of the child). See 
also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ 
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1756–57 (1992) (suggesting that “[a]dults—judges, 
policy makers, and parents—make wiser, more principled, and more authentic decisions for and 
about children”). 
 136. Katherine Hunt Federle, Rights Flow Downhill, 2 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 343, 356 
(1994) (discussing the goal of children’s rights as “someday, lead[ing] to a better life for 
children through the articulation of ideal relationships between children and adults in the 
larger community”); Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child, supra note 96, at 1056 (noting that 
children’s rights “were paired with duties and existed so that children might grow and learn to 
do right”). 
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parents and other caregivers to provide children with the help they 
need to realize their potential. 
 
2. Children’s rights benefit the state 
 
Defenders of parental rights argue that a strong deference to 
parental rights is necessary for the health and welfare of the state, but 
children’s rights advocates can make a similarly compelling 
argument. Such arguments were first articulated by the Progressive 
reformers who argued that children should not to be treated as 
property of their parents. According to the Progressives, “the child’s 
highest duty was no longer obedience to parents, but preparation for 
citizenship.”137 Progressive reformers believed that children required 
and had the right to a certain level of exposure to ideas and 
education that would enable them to become the type of 
independent, autonomous citizens necessary to the continuation of 
the liberal state. They believed that through mandatory public school 
the State would be able “to train citizens to exercise their rights in a 
democracy; to imbue immigrants and the poor with ‘American’ 
ideals and culture; and to equalize opportunity for advancement in 
an egalitarian society.”138 Consequently, because this training was 
considered essential for the health of the state, cases such as Meyer 
and Pierce and the doctrine of parental rights, which permitted 
parents to remove children from the common school, were 
considered a serious threat. 
The idea that the survival of our constitutional democracy rests 
on the proper training of our future citizens was not limited to the 
Progressive Movement and has been repeatedly reaffirmed. In Brown 
v. Board of Education,139 the Supreme Court struck down segregated 
schools as unconstitutional and explained that such schools harm 
African American children in a manner that undermines “the very 
foundation of good citizenship.”140 According to the Brown Court, a 
denial of educational opportunities denies children the tools 
necessary for their role as future citizens. The Court reiterated this 
idea more recently in Grutter v. Bollinger, stating, “We have 
 
 137. Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child, supra note 96, at 1051. 
 138. Id. at 1006. 
 139. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 140. Id. at 493. 
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repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing 
students for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to 
‘sustaining our political and cultural heritage’ with a fundamental 
role in maintaining the fabric of society.”141 
C. The Problem with Children’s Rights 
Discussing children’s rights as separate from parental rights can 
be difficult. Children are by definition dependent. One cannot 
consider the rights of children without also considering the rights of 
the people on whom they are dependent, most often their parents.142 
Consequently, greater children’s rights will often mean greater 
governmental oversight of parental decision making, which can be 
problematic. It is highly questionable whether the government will 
make better decisions regarding children than parents. As Professor 
Guggenheim has noted, “[a] best interests inquiry is not a neutral 
investigation that leads to an obvious result. It is an intensely value-
laden inquiry.”143 Given this difficulty, Guggenheim concludes that 
permitting childrearing decisions to be made by parents, the people 
who know the child best, rather than state officials who may never 
have even met the child, is the best means of achieving a desirable 
result.144  
The Iowa Supreme Court case of Painter v. Bannister145 provides 
a compelling example of how a concern with children’s rights and 
best interests may be no more likely to effectuate a child’s best 
interests than cases decided according to a doctrine of parental 
rights. In Painter, a fit father lost custody of his son to the child’s 
maternal grandparents because of the court’s distaste for the father’s 
unconventional, arty lifestyle.146 The court’s evidence to support its 
determination that paternal custody was not in the child’s best 
interest were facts such as the father’s wearing of a “sport shirt and 
sweater” to his wife’s funeral, his failure to paint the outside of his 
house, and his preference for “uncut weeds and wild oats” rather 
than a neatly trimmed lawn.147 The custody decision was a clear 
 
 141. 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)). 
 142. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 13. 
 143. Id. at 38–39. 
 144. Id. 
 145. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966). 
 146. Id. at 156. 
 147. Id. at 155. 
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reflection of the judges’ distaste of the father’s lifestyle and the 
judges’ personal perception of the child’s best interest. The decision 
was made according to a best-interest-of-the-child standard, but it is 
far from clear that the court’s decision actually served the child’s best 
interest.148 
An additional problem with children’s rights is that too much 
State involvement may actually thwart the increased autonomy that 
children’s rights advocates seek to create. One of the most 
compelling reasons behind the parental rights doctrine is the idea 
that protecting family privacy helps foster independent, autonomous 
adults who will be capable of exercising the type of free will necessary 
to the continuation of the liberal state. Too much State involvement 
in childrearing decisions runs the danger of homogenizing families 
and preventing the necessary liberal independence.149 
IV. PARENTAL RIGHTS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, AND IMMIGRANT 
CHILDREN 
The strongest argument favoring parental rights is that parental 
rights do not just benefit parents, but they also benefit children. This 
supposition is based on the premise that biological parents are best 
suited to act in their children’s best interests, that children would 
prefer to remain with their parents, and that parental rights ensure 
stability and security for children. As discussed above, the well-
established criticisms of a parental rights standard cast significant 
doubt on these assumptions in general. However, in the context of 
immigrant family reunification, the problems with the assumption 
that parental rights benefit children are magnified exponentially. 
 
 148. The Iowa Supreme Court certainly felt that the trial judge’s decision granting 
custody to the father had been in error and reversed. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 41 
(“However alluring and child-friendly the ‘best interests’ test appears, in truth it is a formula 
for unleashing state power, without any meaningful reassurance of advancing children’s 
interests.”). See also Zug, supra note 4, at 16–20 (describing the personal biases that often 
accompany termination decisions in the immigration context). 
 149. It should be noted, however, that similar concerns regarding state intrusion into 
childrearing were voiced against many of the Progressive reforms that are now accepted as 
correct and beneficial, such as mandatory school attendance and child labor bans. For example, 
in 1924, the president of Columbia University spoke out against the child labor bills pending 
in Congress, warning that they “would empower Congress to invade the rights of parents and 
to shape family life to its liking.” GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 3. 
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A. Parental Rights Assumptions and Separations Due to Abuse and 
Neglect 
Immigrant reunification cases concern the issue of whether to 
reunite children with their deportable or deported parents. These 
cases involve children who have already been separated from their 
parents. Such separations can occur for a number of reasons. 
Immigrant children may be separated from their parents due to 
allegations of abuse or neglect, or simply because of their parents’ 
undocumented status.150 As discussed above, the parental rights 
presumption that reunification is in the children’s best interest has 
been subject to significant criticism. Opponents of this standard have 
argued that, particularly in the context of abuse and neglect cases, 
presumptions that parents act in their children’s best interest, that 
children prefer to remain with their biological parents, and that 
keeping biological families together provides stability and security, 
are highly questionable.151 Reuniting a child with a formerly abusive 
or neglectful parent is concerning in the typical case. However, in 
the immigration context such concerns are amplified. Once a child is 
reunited with a deported parent, there is no longer any U.S. 
oversight of these families and, in fact there may be no oversight 
whatsoever. Many of the countries the parents are returning to lack 
institutions and services similar to American child protective services. 
As a result, the dangers of unwise reunification are significantly 
magnified after a parent’s deportation. Any abuse that occurs after 
deportation is unlikely to ever be discovered.152  
A related concern involves the limited facilities available in the 
deported parents’ country of origin. Within the United States, 
parents seeking reunification have the opportunity to take classes, 
attend counseling, and have their children looked after by others 
while they attempt to remedy the conditions that resulted in the 
removal of their children. Children’s rights advocates often argue 
 
 150. In a minority of these cases, children were separated from their parents when the 
parents were detained in workplace raids for other immigration violations. 
 151. See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 791–92 (arguing it violated the constitutional right of 
newborns to be placed with parents who have a history of abusing or neglecting their 
children). 
 152. In addition, the assumption that children would prefer to return to abusive and 
neglectful parents and that a policy of reunification provides the greatest degree of stability and 
security for these children is also highly suspect. 
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that hopelessly unfit parents are given too many chances,153 but the 
underlying idea is that with the proper help and resources, many, if 
not most, of these parents can become fit. However, the glaring 
problem with such assumptions in the immigration context is that 
many of the parents’ countries’ of origin lack these services. 
Therefore, even if a domestic violence class could solve the parents’ 
problems, the lack of such classes in the parents’ home countries 
means that parents’ abilities to remedy the conditions that led to the 
removal of their children in the first instance is non-existent. This 
unfortunate reality counsels against the parental rights doctrine’s 
assumption that children’s interests are protected by recognizing 
parental rights. Such an assumption may make sense in countries like 
the United States that have the resources and procedures in place to 
catch cases of abuse and neglect, but this assumption is far too 
dangerous to apply in the immigration context.154 
B. Parental Rights Assumptions and Separations Due to Status 
Although many immigrant children are separated from their 
parents due to abuse and neglect, many other cases concern parents 
who were separated from their children solely due to their 
immigration status.155 These are fit parents who have been separated 
from their children simply because they have the wrong immigration 
status.156 However, even in these cases, which concern fit parents, 
 
 153. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 130. 
 154. Even in the United States, far too many of these cases go undetected. See ANDREA J. 
SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NATIONAL 
INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 13, 15–16 (1996), available at 
http://www.law.uh.edu/hjhlp/Issues/Vol_81/Kelly.pdf (estimating that there are 1,553,800 
incidences of child abuse and neglect annually but child protection agencies intervened in or 
investigated only 872,000 of these incidences). The likelihood that these statistics would be far 
worse in many foreign countries is high. 
 155. In this group, I am including parents accused of abuse and neglect based simply on 
their immigration status or bias against immigrants. As demonstrated in my previous article, 
the bias against immigrants is significant and immigrant parents have been declared unfit based 
on little more than the language they speak or their immigration status. Accordingly, a best 
interest standard offers parents even less protection, making them more susceptible to anti-
immigrant biases. Zug, supra note 4, at 21–24. 
 156. It should be noted, however, that immigration raid separations are likely to 
decrease. During the Bush administration, there were a number of highly publicized workplace 
raids in which parents were separated from their children due to Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) detention. However, under the Obama administration, large-scale 
workplace raids have diminished and ICE has instituted humanitarian release guidelines to 
identify and release parents such as sole caregivers, nursing mothers, pregnant women and 
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when a parent is facing deportation it weakens the parental rights 
presumption that parental rights benefit children.  
In the immigration context, parental and children’s interests can 
easily clash.157 As Professor Bridget Carr has noted, harsh 
immigration laws put parents in “impossibly difficult positions” and, 
under such circumstances, it is unwise to assume that parents act in 
their children’s best interest.158 However, it is important to note that 
this clash is unlikely to arise prior to deportation proceedings. It is 
only at the point of deportation that immigration status becomes an 
issue likely to cause a rift between the parents’ interests and the 
children’s. Before deportation is at issue there is no justification for 
applying a different standard for immigrant families. Removing a 
child based on best-interest considerations before the parent is facing 
deportation is wrong.  
In Separation, Deportation, Termination, I discussed numerous 
instances in which child welfare services removed children from their 
parents simply because their parents were undocumented 
immigrants.159 Then, after this unjustified removal, the agency would 
 
others. See Guidelines for Identifying Humanitarian Concerns among Administrative Arrestees, 
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/wkplce_ 
enfrcmnt/ice-hum-guidelines.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2011). Further, in 2009, these 
guidelines were expanded to include workplaces of twenty-five or more employees. Previously, 
they had only applied to workplaces with 150 employees or more. See Daphne Eviatar, 
Immigration Raid Rules Echo Bush Era, THE WASH. INDEP. (May 6, 2009), 
http://washingtonindependent.com/ 41963/immigration-raid-rules-echo-bush-era. In 
addition, other reforms, providing further protections may also become standard. See AJAY 
CHAUDRY ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (Feb. 2010), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412020_FacingOurFuture_ final.pdf (suggesting 
additional immigration reforms such as, detaining parents closer to home in order to facilitate 
visitation with children when detention is mandatory). 
 157. See Bridget A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into 
Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120 (2009). Professor Carr 
focuses specifically on the situation where children have a different immigration status from 
their parents, meaning they are eligible to remain in the United States when their parents are 
not. In such circumstances, Carr notes that their interests may be far from aligned, and that 
recognizing only the parents’ interests can have disastrous consequences for the child. See id. at 
130–40. 
 158. Id. at 120 (noting that, in certain cases, parents may have to “choose between 
abandoning their children in a foreign land and risking the torture of their children”). 
 159. See, e.g., Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068 (Cal. App. 
Sept. 8, 2009); In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 493 (Ga. App. 2001); In re Angelica L., 767 
N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009). See generally Zug, supra note 4, at 21–27 (describing how these 
termination cases were based upon the parents undocumented status). 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:57 PM 
1139 Should I Stay or Should I Go 
 1175 
claim it was in the child’s interest to have their parents’ rights 
terminated because the children had become attached to their foster 
parents. In such cases, the welfare agencies created the conditions 
that led to the court’s conclusion that termination was in the 
children’s best interest. This Article is in no way endorsing such 
actions. Nevertheless, once a parent is facing deportation, the 
possibility of divergent interests increases significantly, and this fact 
cannot be ignored. 
A stark example of this potential conflict is demonstrated in the 
case of Olowo v. Ashcroft.160 Olowo involved an undocumented 
immigrant mother who sought derivative asylum based on the claim 
that if she were deported she would have no choice but to allow her 
young daughters to undergo female genital mutilation back in 
Nigeria.161 The daughters, however, were legal permanent residents 
and had the right to stay in the United States. Given the children’s 
right to remain, the court was highly disturbed by the mother’s 
intention to return to Nigeria with her daughters. The court 
recognized that in this case, the mother’s interest in reunification 
strongly conflicted with the best interests of her children.162 As a 
result, the court contacted the Illinois department of Family Services 
and the Illinois State’s Attorney for Cook County in order to prevent 
reunification.163 
Olowo vividly demonstrates how parents’ and children’s interests 
can conflict in the immigration context and also how vulnerable 
children are once they are reunited with their deported parents. As 
long as the daughters remained in the United States, any attempts to 
circumcise them would have been meet with criminal sanctions and 
loss of custody. Within the United States, we can afford the luxury of 
 
 160. 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 161. Id. at 697. 
 162. Id. at 704 n.9. Professor Carr notes how easily the children’s interests could have 
been ignored in this case. She notes that the mother’s mistake was alerting the judge to the 
threat of female genital mutilation (FGM). If the mother had not raised the issue then the 
daughters would not have been removed and could have returned to Nigeria with her when 
she was deported, where they might have been subject to FGM. This demonstrates, 
particularly in the immigration context, a significant problem with the parental rights 
doctrine’s assumption that parents act in their children’s best interest. Carr, supra note 157, at 
133–34. 
 163. Olowo, 368 F.3d at 704 (noting that it was alerting those “whose duty it is to 
represent the people of the State of Illinois in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act of 
1987 . . . which protects minors from parents who allow acts of torture to be committed on 
minors”). 
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assuming parents act in their children’s best interest because 
instances in which this assumption is incorrect will hopefully be 
revealed and remedied through channels such as doctors, teachers, 
and social workers.164 There is no such safety net when children leave 
with deported parents. Although immigrant parents are no more 
likely to act against their children’s interests than American parents, 
the repercussions of bad parental decisions may be far greater. 
Consequently, when parents facing deportation have already lost 
custody of their child due to a finding of unfitness the concern that 
they may act against their child’s best interests in the future is 
increased. Ms. Olowo may never have truly intended to take her 
daughters to Nigeria with her if deported. Perhaps she was simply 
making the best case she could to gain asylum. However, there is no 
way to know.  
Once deported parents leave with their children, U.S. oversight 
terminates. Ms. Olowo was never judged unfit prior to her asylum 
application. Had she forgone her asylum application and agreed to 
deportation, no one would have questioned her right to take her 
daughters. What this reveals is that even in the context of “fit” 
parents, the clash between parent and child interests can be 
significant. Thus, when courts are considering the reunification of 
children with previously judged unfit parents facing deportation, 
there are particularly compelling reasons to employ a “best interests 
of the child” standard.165  
C. Presuming Children Want to Be with Their Biological Parents 
In the immigration context, there are also strong reasons to 
question the parental rights assumption that children prefer to 
remain with their parents.166 Many of the immigrant parents’ 
countries of origin are substantially poorer and less developed than 
 
 164. See, for example, state laws such as S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-610 (requiring certain 
persons to report child abuse). 
 165. According to John Rawls, the basic rights of children “as future citizens are 
inalienable” and it is the government’s responsibility to “protect them wherever they are.” 
RAWLS, supra note 30, at 471. 
 166. The case of Walter Polovchak, Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 
1985), is a famous example of a child resisting return. Walter was the child of Ukrainian 
immigrants who refused to return to the Soviet Union with his parents and sought political 
asylum in the United States in order to remain in the United States. Walter’s parents were not 
being deported. Rather, they were returning voluntarily based on their belief that the move 
was in their family’s best interest. Walter, however, adamantly disagreed with this assessment. 
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the United States.167 As a result, for many of these children, 
reunification means being sent to a country where they will be 
poorer, where they may receive little or no education, where medical 
facilities are inadequate, and where sufficient food and clean water 
are sporadic or unavailable. It may also mean reunification in 
countries with fewer freedoms and significantly more violence.168  
For example, in her work documenting indigenous Guatemalan 
women detained in immigration raids, Professor Karla McKanders 
describes the conditions that lead many women to leave Guatemala 
and the conditions they and their children would face if returned. 
She notes that in addition to extreme poverty, limited educational 
opportunities, and pervasive discrimination, there is also a well-
documented and deeply rooted tradition of domestic violence which 
frequently ends in death.169 In such circumstances, it is not hard to 
imagine that given the choice, many children would prefer to remain 
in the United States without their parents.170 Forcing children to 
leave with their deported parents may not be what many children 
want and could substantially undermine their future prospects. 
Because it may undermine children’s future prospects, mandatory 
reunification may be unconstitutional, and it is certainly not in the 
children’s best interests.171 
 
 167. See, e.g., Karla McKanders, The Unspoken Voices of Indigenous Women in 
Immigration Raids, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 (2010) (describing the conditions that lead 
many indigenous Guatemalan women to leave). 
 168. Many of the mothers involved in deportation proceedings “allege that they migrated 
to the United States to escape some type of domestic abuse or gendered violence that the 
government was unable to control.” Id. at 33. 
 169. Id. at 24 (noting that “since 2000 more than 4,000 women and girls have been 
murdered in Guatemala” and that few of these murders result in convictions). 
 170. In re Polovchak, 432 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ill. App. 1981) (involving a child that ran 
away from home because he did not want to return to Ukraine with his parents). 
 171. See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 811 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171 
(2007)) (arguing that state decisions that hinder a child’s “ability to realize to realize their full 
potential” may be unconstitutional); see also Polovchak, 432 N.E.2d at 877; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT 
MORE THAN EVER (2004); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 1 (1999); T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, in DEMOCRACY: 
A READER 211 (Ricardo Blaug & John Schwarzmantel eds., 2001) (describing citizenship as 
entailing “the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized 
being according to the standards prevailing in the society”). 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1178 
D. Parental Rights Assumption Regarding Stability and Security 
The doctrine of parental rights also assumes reunification 
benefits children because it fosters stability and security. However, 
this is often not true. Many immigrant reunification cases involve 
children who have lived with foster parents for years, have little 
memory of their biological parents, speak only English, and have 
become accustomed to an American way of life.172 For children in 
these circumstances, it is reunification that will cause significant 
disruption to the stability and security of their life. For these 
children, reunification would mean leaving the only home and family 
they have ever known in order to go to a foreign country to live with 
parents they do not remember and where they may not even speak 
the language. It is not clear that reunification under such 
circumstances is in a child’s best interest. The parental rights 
doctrine assumes that children achieve stability and security by 
remaining with their parents. However, for immigrant children who 
may already have been separated from their parents for significant 
amounts of time, it is their attachment to a place that may have been 
providing this sense of stability and security.173 In such cases, it is life 
in America that has been the only constant for these children. 
Forcing them to leave to reunite with a deported parent may do 
more harm than good. A children’s rights standard allows such 
considerations to be taken into account. 
A children’s rights approach focuses on the best interests of the 
child and whether the child desires reunification. Given this focus, it 
is clear that a children’s rights standard has significant benefits for 
immigrant children. However, it is not obvious that children’s 
interests outweigh the equally substantial interests of fit parents in 
the care and custody of their children. Thus, the decisive factor 
should be the state’s interests. When children’s interests are 
considered in tandem with the state’s interest, this calculus changes.  
 
 172. Many of these foster parents also wish to adopt the children. See, e.g., supra notes 7–
16 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Carlos Romero). 
 173. In fact, a recent study published in the British Journal of Social Work indicates that 
the importance of children’s attachment to a place may be just as important as their attachment 
to relatives or caregivers. The article examines “the significance of children’s place attachments 
for the development of their identity, security and sense of belonging” and concludes that 
stability in location is of significant importance. See Gordon Jack, Place Matters: The 
Significance of Place Attachments for Children’s Well-Being, 40 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 755 
(2010). 
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V. IMMIGRANT REUNIFICATION DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE 
UNDER A BEST INTEREST STANDARD 
A. State’s and Children’s Interests Align 
The state has a significant interest in keeping American 
immigrant children in the United States. This interest, combined 
with the children’s best interest, weighs in favor of applying a 
children’s rights approach to immigrant family reunification 
decisions. As the above analysis demonstrates, both the State’s and 
children’s interests indicate that immigrant reunification and 
termination decisions should be decided according to a best-interest-
of-the-child analysis. As Professor Emily Buss has written, “Where 
the child’s views align with either the parents’ or the state’s, the 
child’s position should have special developmental force.”174 It 
should also be noted that regardless of the state’s specific interest in 
raising future American citizens, the state should be inclined to favor 
children’s interests over the parents’ simply because the children are 
citizens and the parents are not. Between the interests of citizens and 
noncitizens, the state’s interests, in most instances, should favor the 
citizen.175 
Congress’s plenary power over immigration means that Congress 
has the power to treat noncitizens differently than citizens.176 
 
 174. Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 44 (2004) [hereinafter Buss, Allocating Developmental Control] 
(“A state’s interest in having a child receive a certain form or extent of education, however 
strong in the abstract, becomes stronger when aligned with the expressed interest of the child 
in pursuing that education. Conversely, a parent’s interest in avoiding that education becomes 
stronger if aligned with the child’s interest in avoiding it. This is not simple math and tie-
breaking. Rather, it recognizes that the interests at stake, and related expertise, in fact change 
with the alignments. The state is in a far better position to assess, and meet, the educational 
needs of a child aspiring to leave her parent’s community and join mainstream society and the 
national economy, than to assess and meet the needs of a child who aspires to live apart. 
Similarly, the child’s common interest in a certain form of upbringing can serve to legitimize 
the parents’ authority as the best (and most competent) assessor of the child’s developing 
needs.”). 
 175. But see Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 25 October 1980, 
Hague XXVIII at 13 (requiring US courts to cede custody jurisdiction over US citizen 
children to a foreign court if the child was wrongly removed). 
 176. In practice, what this plenary power means is that noncitizens denied entry at the 
border have virtually no due process rights. See Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 
(1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process . . . .”). Even 
long-term residents have fewer constitutional protections. “Scholars and courts alike have long 
noted, and often decried, the constitutional exceptionalism of the immigration power within 
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Noncitizens have constitutional rights, but they have repeatedly been 
found to be more limited than the rights of citizens.177 
Consequently, preferring state interests and citizen children’s 
interests over that of their foreign parents is justified even if this 
choice would not be supportable with regard to citizen parents.178 
When considering the reunification of citizen children with deported 
or deportable parents, a best interest standard must apply. 
B. A Best Interest Standard Does Not Automatically Require 
Separation 
In addition to the arguments presented above, a best-interest-of-
the-child approach is desirable because in most cases it will not result 
in the termination of parental rights. In the majority of cases, an 
evaluation of the child’s best interest will demonstrate that the child 
would be best served by reunification with his or her parents. As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Santosky v. Kramer, “Even when a 
child’s natural home is imperfect, permanent removal from that 
home will not necessarily improve his welfare.”179 The Santosky 
Court recognized that “termination of parental rights [does not] 
necessarily ensure adoption,” and “even when a child eventually 
finds an adoptive family, he may spend years moving between State 
 
American public law.” PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS 
ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998) (using the terms legal “maverick” and “wild 
card” to characterize immigration law); Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: 
Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2010); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1704 (1992) 
(remarking on the “singularity” of immigration).Given the fact that Congress is not 
significantly constrained by the Constitution with regard to immigration policy, it is possible 
that an intentional congressional policy of separation could be constitutional. For example, 
since many of these cases involve American citizens, Congress could find that the benefits of an 
American education, English, and other opportunities available to all citizens could justify 
keeping these children in America regardless of whether their parents were considered unfit. 
 177. See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 178. As the 11th Circuit stated in United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1025 (11th 
Cir. 2001), “Congress can pass laws regulating the conduct of noncitizens within the United 
States, and those laws do not violate equal protection so long as they are rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.” The health and welfare of children and future citizens would 
certainly meet this low standard. See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (noting 
that decisions made by Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization 
are subject to “a narrow standard of review” equivalent to rational-basis scrutiny). 
 179. 455 U.S. 745, 765 n.15 (1982). 
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institutions and ‘temporary’ foster placements after his ties to his 
natural parents have been severed.”180  
For many children, termination will not result in a better life. 
Instead, it will lead to a childhood in foster care and all its attendant 
problems. A best-interest-of-the-child standard does not require this 
result. It ensures that the children’s interests are truly considered. It 
means that children old enough to express their desire to remain in 
the United States will likely be able to do so.181 It also means that 
children too young to make such an evaluation will still have their 
best interests, rather than their parents’ interests, considered. In 
addition, it means that the State’s interest in the welfare of its 
citizens does not end at the borders. At the same time, it does not 
mean that immigrant parents will automatically or even routinely 
lose custody of their children upon deportation. Under this 
approach, immigrant parents will only have their rights terminated 
when termination is in their child’s best interests, and most of the 
time termination will not be. Rarely will better resources or 
opportunities be enough, by themselves, to overcome the benefits of 
remaining with a loving and caring parent. 
VI. A WORKABLE FRAMEWORK 
Children’s rights and parental rights are traditionally viewed in 
opposition to one another,182 and the debate between the two 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. See generally Leslie A. Fithian, Forcible Repatriation of Minors: The Competing Rights 
of Parents and Child, 37 STAN. L. REV. 187 (discussing cases in which children wished to 
remain in the United States against their parents’ wishes). 
 182. See DWYER, supra note 105 (discussing the conflict between parental rights and 
children’s rights in the context of religious schooling); Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, 
Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 63, 66 (discussing this either-or dichotomy in the context of 
adoption and stating that “the replacement of traditional parent-focused standards for court 
intervention by a purportedly child-focused standard would represent a disturbing erosion of 
critical due process protections that serve the interests of both parents and children”); David J. 
Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights 
Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 139 (1992); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 
638–40 (2006) (“[T]he debate between advocates of parents’ rights and children’s rights is 
charged and polarized.”); Orly Rachmilovitz, Achieving Due Process Through Comprehensive 
Care for Mentally Disabled Parents: A Less Restrictive Alternative to Family Separation, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 785, 824 (2010) (noting that traditionally, at least on the context of abuse 
and neglect, “parents’ rights and children’s rights were considered in opposition to each 
other”). 
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positions does not lend itself to an easy resolution.183 Both children’s 
and parental rights advocates have spent decades debating which is 
the preferable position.184 Moreover, these “either-or” arguments 
tend to reject the possibility of a middle ground and the possibility 
that both doctrines can coexist.185 However, parental rights and 
children’s rights can and must coexist. As the long fight between 
children’s rights and parental rights advocates has shown, both 
standards have their place but neither one is right for all 
circumstances. In the context of undocumented immigrant families, 
a parental rights approach is appropriate before deportation, but 
once a child’s parents have been deported, reunification and 
termination decisions must be made under a best-interest-of-the-
child standard. 
 
 183. Huntington, supra note 182, at 640 (“Preservationists contend that a misconstrued 
articulation of children’s rights and de-emphasis of parents’ rights results in too much 
intervention in the home in the form of removal (or threatened removal). Child protectionists 
claim that too much emphasis on parents’ rights and a misconstrued articulation of children’s 
rights results in too little intervention in the home.”). 
 184. See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 38–43 (arguing that the best interests 
doctrine is “intensely value-laden” and that the parental rights doctrine is preferable); 
Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 323, 337 
(2004) (noting that the law “generally lets adult interests trump children’s” and that it must be 
adjusted to “place greater emphasis on parental responsibilities and children’s rights”); Dwyer, 
supra note 121, at 1439 (arguing that children’s rights should trump parental rights); John 
Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987) 
(discussing the tension between children’s rights and parental rights and concluding that 
children’s rights should not trump those of the parents); Alfred A. Mamo, Early Identification 
and Prevention of Parent-Child Alienation: A Framework for Balancing Risks and Benefits of 
Intervention, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 136, 145 (2010) (“[P]arental rights may need to be trumped 
by the children’s rights.”); Christopher Tollefsen, John Paul II and Children’s Education, 21 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 159, 177 (2007) (describing children’s rights 
advocate James Dwyer as claiming that “children’s rights should entirely trump any claim to 
parental rights”); Erik M. Zimmerman, Note, Defending the Parental Right to Direct 
Education: Meyer and Pierce as Bulwarks Against State Indoctrination, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 
311, 332 (2004–2005) (noting that Barbara Bennett Woodhouse and other children’s rights 
advocates “would like to replace parental rights with ‘Children’s Rights’”). 
 185. An example of such consideration is Professor Emily Buss’s thoughtful proposal in 
which she suggests allocating parental rights versus children’s rights based on independent 
rights asserting conduct of the child. Buss would preference children’s rights over parental 
rights in when the rights were sought first by the child. Thus, Buss would rarely, if ever, 
consider the rights of minor children to trump parental rights but would be very inclined to 
permit this in the cases of older children. Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 
174, at 44. See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (articulating the idea of a flexible, 
but perhaps unworkable, standard for parental rights); Rachmilovitz, supra note 182, at 824 
(arguing for an aggregation of parental and children’s rights, suggesting that that can be 
viewed as “different aspects of the same right”). 
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A. The Adoption and Safe Families Act 
The idea of a triggering event that justifies a switch from parental 
rights to children’s rights may seem novel, but it is not. The 
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) demonstrates a 
similar compromise between children’s rights and parental rights. 
ASFA supports the traditional parental rights framework during the 
initial months after a child is removed from his or her parents. 
However, after a child has been out of her parents’ care for fifteen 
out of the last twenty-two months, the emphasis shifts to a children’s 
rights standard.186 After this triggering event, the Act no longer seeks 
the traditional parental rights goal of reunification. Instead, the focus 
shifts to the best interest of the child and the goal of adoption. Thus, 
after this point, the parents’ rights will be terminated unless it is in 
the children’s best interest not to have them terminated.  
The purpose of ASFA was to give increased consideration to 
children’s rights.187 Whereas previous child welfare policy focused on 
reunification, and thus on the rights of parents, ASFA’s focus shifted 
to termination and the best interest of the child.188 ASFA increased 
 
 186. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 187. During the ASFA testimony, Rep. Deborah Pryce of Ohio stated that ASFA would 
“elevate children’s rights so that a child’s health and safety will be of paramount concern under 
the law . . . . Let us do it for the children.” 143 CONG. REC. H10,776–05, H10,789 (daily ed. 
Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce). See also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 63, at 208 
(noting that ASFA “was widely heralded as a children’s rights victory”); Elizabeth Bartholet, 
The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous 
Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 928 (2009) (“ASFA is, in my view, a good law because it 
shifts the balance in child welfare law and policy somewhat in the direction of valuing 
children’s rights more, and parents’ rights less.”). 
 188. ASFA was passed in response to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 
(AACWA), which focused on parental rights and required states to make “reasonable efforts” 
at reunification even in cases of child abuse and murder. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2006) 
(assuring “that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a 
child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, 
and (B) to make it possible for the child to safely return to the child’s home”). The 
Congressional testimony surrounding the passage of ASFA reveals the disagreement with this 
former policy. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S12668 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Jeffords) (“[I]f a parent has been found to have murdered another child in the family, or has 
subjected a child to chronic abuse, it is unreasonable—and irrational—to insist that the state 
return that child to the family.”); 143 CONG. REC. S12,198 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) 
(statement of Sen. Helms) (“Foster care children should not be returned to unfit, abusive 
parents . . . . Because the current Federal law requires States to make reasonable efforts to 
reunite children with their biological parents, children have tragically been returned to their 
abusive and sometimes murderous parents.”); 143 CONG. REC. H2012 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1184 
federal incentives for adoptions and permitted parental rights 
terminations for most children who had been in foster care for more 
than a year. Although the Act has been the subject of significant 
criticism,189 such criticisms are primarily based on the premise that 
ASFA terminations do not actually achieve the best interest of the 
child.190 The criticism that ASFA violates the parent’s rights is rare.191 
Even ASFA’s critics appear to accept ASFA’s premise that there 
needs to be increased consideration of children’s best interests in 
 
1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce) (“[T]he most important change we can make is to elevate the 
rights of children because too often a foster child’s best interests are abandoned while courts 
and welfare agencies drag their feet. To correct this injustice, H.R. 867 [ASFA] places the 
safety and well-being of children above efforts by the State to reunite them with biological 
parents who have abused or neglected them.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Naomi Kahn, Children’s Interest in a Familial Context, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1189, 1204 (1999) (noting for example that the emphasis on termination may be harmful in 
instances where adoption prospects are unlikely); Jane Murphy, Protecting Children by 
Preserving Parenthood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 969, 981 (2006) (arguing that even if 
one “considers ASFA strictly from a child’s perspective, its harm to children as a form of 
parentage disestablishment law is apparent”); Deborah Parach, The Orphaning of 
Underprivileged Children: America’s Failed Child Welfare Law & Policy, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
119, 158 (2006) (suggesting that courts should always consider the “best interests of the 
child” before terminating parental rights and that such a consideration would often counsel 
against termination); Dorothy Roberts, Is There Justice in Children’s Rights?: The Critique of 
Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112 (1999). 
 190. Courts have also criticized ASFA for its harm to children. See, e.g., In re Adoption of 
Corey, 707 N.Y.S.2d 767, 773 (Fam. Ct. 1999) (finding that § 378–a(2)(e)(1) of ASFA 
violates the procedural due process rights of foster children because it fails to protect them 
from “arbitrary State decisions which significantly impact their custody and welfare”). 
 191. See Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (2009) (noting that “the expedited timelines of ASFA may conflict” 
with parental rights); Catherine J. Ross, Legal Constraints on Child-Saving: The Strange Case of 
the Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints at Yearning for Zion Ranch, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 361 
(2008) (criticizing an article on ASFA for its implication that parental rights are no longer 
relevant to ASFA terminations). Interestingly, such arguments are often made by law students. 
See, e.g., Ian Vandewalker, Note, Taking the Baby Before it is Born, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 423, 442 (2008) (arguing that the ASFA timeline violates the due process rights of 
drug addicted mothers because it is well documented that effective drug treatment programs 
often take at least two years, more than the time permitted under ASFA); Amy Wilkinson-
Hagen, Note, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: A Collision of Parens Patriae and 
Parents’ Constitutional Rights, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 137, 141 (2004) (arguing 
that ASFA “harms some parents because its broad language, arbitrary time requirements and 
anti-reunification funding schemes apply unfairly to certain parents, therefore violating both 
substantive and procedural due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment”). At 
the same time, however, Hagen states that ASFA’s purpose of acting in children’s best interests 
is “noble and attractive” and “should be a matter of serious concern, even when weighed 
against the interests of parents who wish to maintain relationships with their children.” Id. at 
140. 
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parental termination decisions and that there is a point at which 
children’s interests outweigh those of their parents.192 This 
agreement regarding the appropriateness of increased attention to 
children’s rights is significant and was certainly not a given. 
Consequently, it is important to examine why, for the most part, 
ASFA’s compromise has been accepted.193  
From a parental rights standpoint, ASFA is a threat. The Act 
infringes on parents’ rights to the care and custody of their children. 
Many of the parents whose rights are terminated under ASFA are not 
abusive, but have lost custody of their children due to neglect 
resulting from poverty or other circumstances beyond their 
control.194 In addition, even in cases of abuse, many of these parents 
could become fit parents if provided with the resources and time 
needed to correct their behavior. Therefore, because many, or at 
least some, of these parents have the potential to remedy the 
conditions the led to their child’s removal, termination arguably 
violates their parental rights.195  
Similarly, from the children’s rights standpoint ASFA does not 
go nearly far enough. If parental rights terminations were truly 
evaluated according to best interests of the child, the question would 
not be whether the parents have the potential to one day become fit 
and regain custody but whether having children wait for this 
 
 192. Scholarly criticisms of ASFA are primarily that it does not actually achieve the best 
interests of children. See supra note 189. It is courts, rather than scholars, who are the most 
likely to make the argument that ASFA is unfair to parents. That this position is more likely to 
be taken by courts makes sense considering the decades of legal precedent elevating parental 
rights over children’s rights. See, e.g., In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864, 872 (Ill. 2001) (finding it 
unfair and unconstitutional to find parents unfit just because they did not achieve reunification 
in the required time period and focusing on parental rights and the unfairness of terminating 
their rights when the child had been in foster care for “circumstances beyond the parent’s 
control”); In re Adoption of Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920, 925 (Fam. Ct. 1999) (recognizing that 
ASFA violated both the children’s and the guardian aunt’s due process rights). 
 193. Again, I am referring to the acceptance of the increased attention to children’s rights 
under ASFA. As previously mentioned, other aspects of ASFA have been the subject of 
numerous criticisms, particularly with respect to the idea that it does not effectively protect 
children’s best interests. 
 194. The In re H.G. court used the example of substance abusers who had to wait long 
periods before they could gain admission into substance abuse recovery programs. 757 N.E.2d 
at 872–73. 
 195. For examples of such challenges, see In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d at 866–67 (finding 
that a section of state law presuming parental unfitness where a child was in foster care for 
fifteen out of the last twenty-two months was unconstitutional); In re K.R., No. 99–2009, 
2000 WL 854325 (Iowa Ct. App. June 28, 2000) (rejecting parents claim that they have a 
constitutional right to reunification services). 
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speculative possibility is in the children’s best interest. Under a 
children’s rights approach, terminations should occur as soon as it is 
in the child’s best interest. This could mean immediate termination 
in any case in which the harms of foster care outweighed the 
potential benefits of reunification A children’s rights approach does 
not give parents many “chances.” However, the protection it affords 
children is believed to outweigh the harm it inflicts on parents. 
The ASFA compromise infringes on parental rights and does not 
fully protect children’s rights, but it was accepted because, by and 
large, it still manages to effectuate many of the benefits of both 
standards. A parental rights approach to terminations benefits 
parents by giving them more time and opportunities to regain 
custody of their children; it may benefit children by helping them 
return home and avoid a childhood in foster care; and it benefits the 
state because, if successful, reunification services are cheaper than 
years of foster care. The benefits of a children’s rights approach are 
that it protects children from unsafe reunifications,196 frees children 
from years of foster care by making them available for adoption 
sooner,197 and benefits the State by protecting the health and welfare 
of its future adult citizens.198 ASFA largely manages to retain the 
benefits of both approaches by switching between the two standards 
when the benefits of using children’s rights begin to clearly outweigh 
 
 196. Richard P. Barth et al., From Anticipation to Evidence: Research on the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 371, 372–74 (2005) (citing foster care drift, 
efforts “to reunify children with even the most difficult families,” and research showing that 
even infants were experiencing multiple foster care placements); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting 
Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 637, 646–48 (1999) (noting that ASFA was passed in response to concerns 
that local CPS agencies were undertaking excessive efforts to rehabilitate parents and were 
trying to return children to parents in whose care children could never be safe). 
 197. As ASFA’s critics note, many of these children have few adoption prospects and thus 
receive no benefit from termination. In such circumstances, best interests indicate that parental 
rights should not be terminated. To the extent that ASFA mandates terminations even in such 
instances indicates a problem with how the Act is applied not with the use of a best interest 
standard. See also Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, 
and Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 176, 
179 (2004) (arguing that in some of these cases at the margins, a child would be better served 
by a more flexible approach that would consider the child’s interest in reunification and not be 
bound by the ridged 15/22 requirement). My analysis accepts the stated benefits of ASFA but 
could change based on the conclusion that termination does not achieve the stability and 
permanence alleged. 
 198. By enabling children to be part of a family, their own or a new one, the children’s 
rights approach helps to create independent and autonomous citizens, free from state control 
and quick adoptions, and also help the state avoid the expense of long term foster care. 
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the benefits of using the parental rights standard. The fifteen- to 
twenty-two month cutoff represents the point at which the benefits 
of parental rights and reunification attempts are outweighed by the 
child’s interest in stability and permanence.199 
B. Third Party Visitation Cases 
Third-party visitation cases are also cases in which, after a 
triggering event occurs, the parental rights standard should be 
replaced with a children’s rights standard. However, although this is 
another example of a compromise between children’s and parental 
rights, it is one which I believe is far less effective than both the 
ASFA compromise and the immigration reunification compromise I 
propose. In these cases, the consideration of the child’s best interest 
is likely to cause more harm than good, and thus it is not surprising 
that these cases have garnered much criticism.200 An examination of 
the third-party visitation cases demonstrates why there has been so 
much criticism of these decisions and why such criticism is not 
applicable to my proposed immigrant reunification compromise. 
The role of children’s best interests in third party visitation cases 
gained national attention when the Supreme Court decided Troxel v. 
Granville.201 In Troxel, the Court struck down a Washington state 
statute that would have permitted any third party to seek visitation at 
anytime, regardless of the parent’s objections, so long as the 
visitation was deemed to be in the child’s best interest. Although the 
Supreme Court found the Washington statute overbroad, the 
opinion left open the possibility that less broad visitation statutes 
 
 199. The idea behind the “15 of 22” provision stems from the definitive 1973 book, 
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973), in which the authors argued that a child’s normal 
psychological development depends on a secure and uninterrupted relationship with one 
caregiver and that the impermanency of foster care was detrimental to children’s emotional 
well-being. See also Jennifer Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Terminations: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Length-of-Time-Out-of-Custody Ground for Termination of Parental Rights, 
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251 (1996) (noting this work as the driving idea behind the AFSA 
permanency provision). 
 200. Unlike termination cases, there is significant scholarly writing arguing that third-
party visitation should be decided under a parental rights standard. See, e.g., Lawrence Schlam, 
Third-Party “Standing” and Child Custody Disputes in Washington: Non-Parents Rights—Past, 
Present, and . . . Future?, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 391, 459 (2007–08) (arguing in favor of a best 
interest standard for third party visitation cases). 
 201. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
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would pass constitutional muster.202 Troxel thus indicated that 
parental rights to determine who could visit their child were not 
absolute203 and that increased consideration of the child’s best 
interest in these cases was permissible.204 Post-Troxel, many courts 
embraced the idea that best interest considerations are appropriate in 
third-party visitation cases205 and that third-party visitation claims 
should be evaluated in terms of children’s rights and interests rather 
than parental rights.  
For example, in Downs v. Sheffler,206 the Arizona Court of 
Appeals recently held that “in instances where a fit parent’s right to 
rear her child may conflict with the child’s best interests, the extent 
of a parent’s constitutional right . . . can only be determined by 
weighing that right against countervailing factors, if any, pertaining 
to the best interests of the child.”207 Such conclusions are 
 
 202. Id. at 73; see also Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. 
Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 311 (2000) [hereinafter Buss, Adrift in the Middle] 
(“Taken together, the Court’s refusal to embrace any specific parent-protective standard and 
its apparent openness to visitation statutes that require courts to make best interests 
assessments reveal how far the Troxel Court drifted from its fundamental rights course.”). 
 203. See Ellen Marrus, Over the Hills and Through the Woods to Grandparents’ House We 
Go: Or Do We, Post-Troxel?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 793 (2001) (describing the assertion that 
“parental rights are not absolute” as a “glittering generality” throughout the opinion); 
Lawrence Schlam, Standing in Third-Party Custody Disputes in Arizona: Best Interests to 
Parental Rights—And Shifting the Balance Back Again, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 719, 733 (2005) 
(describing the Troxel decision as the finding that court “must perform a balancing of the 
fundamental rights of the parents with those of the child and state”). 
 204. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A parent’s rights with 
respect to her child have thus never been regarded as absolute . . . a parent’s interest in a child 
must be balanced against the State’s long-recognized interests as parens patriae . . . . [To] the 
extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate 
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be 
balanced in the equation.”); id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]o one believes the parental 
rights are to be absolute.”). 
 205. However, it should be noted that scholarly support for best interests is mixed. 
Compare Sonya Garza, The Troxel Aftermath, 69 LA. L. REV. 927 (2009) (“Post-Troxel, many 
jurisdictions continue to allow third-party visitation petitions to be filed at any time and should 
continue to do so.”), with Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 174 (arguing 
that by affording parents only a weak parental right, the Troxel court opened children up to 
harm through increased litigation). 
 206. 80 P.3d 775, 781 (Ariz. App. 2003). 
 207. Id. See also In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006); Vibbert v. Vibbert, 
144 S.W.3d 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000); 
Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. 2002); Polasek v. Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 521–22 
(Mont. 2006); In re Marriage of O’Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004); Hiller v. 
Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006). 
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questionable. A comparison of the pros and cons of using a best 
interests test in visitation cases demonstrates that a parent’s decision 
not to allow third-party visitation with his or her child does not 
support switching from a parental rights standard to a children’s 
rights standard. 
The triggering event in third-party visitation cases is the parent’s 
decision to reduce or eliminate contact with a third party. However, 
unlike the triggering event in ASFA and immigrant termination 
cases, this trigger does not shift the benefit analysis in favor of 
applying a children’s rights standard. Thus, it is not surprising that 
the decision has been the subject of significant criticism.208 In third- 
party visitation cases, a parental rights standard benefits parents 
because it protects their right to make decisions regarding their 
children, guards against outside intrusions into their home and 
family, and indicates respect for their authority and judgment. 
Similarly, a parental rights approach benefits the state by ensuring 
the independence and autonomy of the family, which, as discussed 
above, is crucial for the development of future citizens. A parental 
rights approach to visitation cases also benefits children. This 
standard ensures that decisions about whom the child visits are made 
by a fit custodial parent, the person most knowledgeable about the 
child’s life and needs and the person most likely to make decisions in 
the child’s best interest.209 Lastly, a parental rights standard protects 
 
 208. See Buss, Adrift in the Middle, supra note 202, at 313 (expressing worry that 
Troxel’s “in-between approach” gave too little guidance “to state and federal courts, charged 
with resolving the host of cases that Troxel [would] inspire”); Janet L. Dolgin, The 
Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 377 (2002) 
(ascribing significant social and legal confusion to Troxel and similar decisions); Marrus, supra 
note 203, at 793 (observing that Troxel disappointed and “raised expectations that the Justices 
would provide clear guidance on how and when states could or could not interfere with the 
parent’s decisions regarding visitation between the child and third parties”); David D. Meyer, 
Constitutional Pragmatism for a Changing American Family, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 711, 712 
(2001) (arguing that Troxel signals the emergence of a flexible standard for parental rights, but 
that it is itself incoherent, “emerg[ing] finally from a meandering tour of hoary platitudes too 
general to be helpful and factual details so case-specific as to give little guidance for the 
future”); Christina M. Alderfer, Note, Troxel v. Granville: A Missed Opportunity to Elucidate 
Children’s Rights, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 963, 1005 (2001) (“The Court took a middle ground 
in this case, thereby offending no one. Unfortunately, the standard for governmental 
interference with parental rights remains extremely vague.”). 
 209. As stated by Professor Emily Buss, “Because the parent knows herself, her child, and 
her entire household better than the state knows them, and stands in a position of greater 
influence than the state over the behavior of all three, the parent is best situated to decide what 
private relationships should be fostered.” “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 649 (2002). 
In addition, Buss argues that parental rights benefit children because parents perform better as 
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children by promoting the stability and security that come from the 
knowledge that parental decisions will be followed and are not 
subject to interference by third parties or the state,210 and by 
protecting them from the hostility and invective that often 
accompanies forced visitation.211 These are significant benefits and 
benefits that largely remain even after a parent has unjustly denied a 
third party visitation. 
Examining these cases from a children’s rights approach reveals 
that children’s rights arguments are not particularly compelling and 
that this conclusion does not change even after the triggering 
event—the denial of third-party visitation—has occurred. A 
children’s rights approach to third-party visitation means that 
visitation decisions would be made according to a child’s best 
interest. Thus, a parent could not deny a child visitation with a third 
party if such visitation was in the child’s best interest.  
The benefit of such a standard is that a child could not be forced 
by a parental whim to lose contact with a person with whom the 
child wished to have a relationship. While it is likely that maintaining 
such relationships will often benefit children, it is not at all clear that 
 
parents if they have “near absolute control over the upbringing of their children.” However, 
Buss notes that “[t]his is not to say that depriving children of particular relationships will never 
be harmful, but rather that we simply cannot expect the state to have any comparative 
advantage over parents in assessing that harm.” Buss, Adrift in the Middle, supra note 202, at 
287, 290. Moreover, most of these third party visitation cases involve very young children, 
making it extremely difficult to know whether such visitation truly represents their preference. 
Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 174, at 38 (“Associational rights claims, 
now commonly asserted by interested adults such as grandparents on behalf of young children, 
would be rare if limited to instances in which children took some form of affirmative action to 
express their associational choices.”). 
 210. Children’s fears of being taken away are well documented. Children will often not 
talk about violence in their homes out of fear they will be taken away from their parents. See 
Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their Children in the 
Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 273, 285 (1999) (“Some children 
fear, legitimately, that if they talk about violence in their homes they will be taken away from 
both their parents”). Further, the stress children feel when visitation occurs against a custodial 
parent’s wishes is well documented in the context of divorce. See generally Benjamin Garber, 
Conceptualizing Visitation Resistance and Refusal in the Context of Parental Conflict, 
Separation and Divorce, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 588 (2007). 
 211. Michele A. Adams, Framing Contests in Child Custody Cases: Parental Alienation 
Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender, and Father’s Rights, 40 FAM. L.Q. 315, 324–327 (2006); 
James H. Bray, Psychosocial Factors Affecting Custodial and Visitation Arrangements, 9 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 419 (1991); Douglas Darnell, Parental Alienation: Not in the Best Interest of the 
Children, 75 N.D. L. REV. 323, 323 (1999) (“Ideally, parents deliberately work on comforting 
and reassuring the children that no harm will come to them.”). 
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the price of maintaining these relationships, namely the significant 
infringement on parental control and decision making, is justified by 
this benefit. The potential harm to family stability and security is 
significant, whereas the harm caused by a parent’s unjustified 
decision to prohibit visitation is arguably minimal.212 Typically, the 
worst case scenario in third party visitation cases is that the denial of 
visitation will prevent a child from developing or maintaining close 
relationship with a third party, such as a grandparent, that would 
have been beneficial for the child. While there is little question that 
such a denial may not be in the child’s best interest and may even 
harm the child, this possible harm is not on par with the potential 
harms discussed in connection with ASFA and undocumented 
immigrant termination decisions.  
The above analysis demonstrates that the benefits of a parental 
rights approach to these visitation cases far outweigh the benefits of a 
children’s rights approach. Nevertheless, post-Troxel courts are 
increasingly receptive to best interest considerations. These best 
interest considerations are far less compelling than those present in 
the case of undocumented immigrant parental rights terminations, 
yet they are increasingly accepted. Consequently, if applying a 
children’s rights standard in third party visitation cases is increasingly 
permissible, it seems axiomatic that such a standard is appropriate in 
undocumented immigrant parental rights termination cases. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Terminating the rights of fit parents is an enormous violation of 
a person’s parental rights. However, the best interests of the child 
justify this violation when those interests align with the best interests 
of the state. Allowing undocumented immigrant parental 
termination decisions to be made according to a best-interest-of-the-
child standard does not mean that children will automatically be 
barred from reunification with their deported parents, but it does 
mean that these decisions will be made according to the child’s best 
interest. As a result, in some cases fit immigrant parents will lose 
custody of their children, and this should be allowed to happen. 
 
 212. A possible exception could be a case such as Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2006), where the third party was denied visitation after he began suspecting the 
mother of physically abusing the child. However even in that type of situation, the parents’ 
denial of visitation rights does not prevent the third party from reporting suspicions of abuse. 
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